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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT -. < H. KT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH 
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, 
RULING 
Plaintiff, : 
vs : 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, : 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, : 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; : Civil No.: 020801343 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, : 
Steve S. Rawlings, : 
: Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff brings this action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule S7 nl ihe Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Chapter 33 of Title 78 of the Utah Code and for injunctive relief pursuant 
to Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff requests this ('< >ui I to make a 
determination regarding the constitutional \\ • fand the application ofUtah Code Ann. §§ lrM-
^ ccr is £> l[: 2l 
""ftcr 
COC.?T 
111 and ?0A- 7 nO 1 et seq. to defendants' decision to certify and place an "Initiative Pet^ 1 
the 2002 general election ballot in Davis (Viml v 1'he Initiative Petition at issue in this case 
requests a re-vote on a fluoridation opinion question that was previously submitted to and, 
approved by voters in l \ i \M , ,nn 11. the general election held on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff 
also seeks to have this Court restrain and enjoin the Davis (' • -«11if y ( i u k and the Davis County 
Commissioners fi uin placing the Initiative Petition on the 2002 general election ballot in Davis 
County. 
On August 23, 2002, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack, of standing and 
requested the Court to dismiss defendant Conwy Commissioners Dan R. McConkie, Carol R. 
Page and Michael J. Cragun from the lawsuit on the basis that the Commissio IMS \\U >l » «olein 
placing the Petition on the ballot I \ :ft ndants also moved the Court to order that a trial of the 
action on the merits be consolidated with the plaintiffs motion it n pu luminal v Injunction. 
On September 1 I ,"(K »2 JI ie above-entitled action was scheduled for a consolidated 
hearing on the merits. David R. Irvine, Janet I. Jenson and A udir iv \\ tttavros appeared on 
behalf of the plaint if t ! luci ( ivil Deputy County Attorney Gerald E. Hess appeared on behalf 
of the defendants. Prior to the hearing, the parties si-binn u cf memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. Upon completion of the hearing, the Court decided to further < un^  in <» 
arguments of the parties and withhold its dmsioh « » (he merits until September 16, 2002, 
wherein the matter was deemed fully submitted to the Court for disposition,., entry of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and final itnlfiiH, nl 
Having fully considered and weighed the record and submit ions, together with the 
arguments oi counsel, ;uui lor f outt cause appearing, the Court now enters this Ruling, to be 
made final upon the Court's further decision on plaintiffs molit m for attorneys' fees and costs as 
discussed in l he Ordering section of this Ruling: 
2 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
1. In accordance with the authority granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111 
(1) (c), the Davis County Commission ("Commission"), on July 26, 2000, adopted a resolution to 
place an opinion question relating to the fluoridation of all public water systems within Davis 
County on the 2000 general election ballot. An amendment to that resolution was adopted by the 
Commission on September 11, 2000. The question, as it appeared on the November 7, 2000 
general election ballot, was: "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis 
CountyT 
2. In the general election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County 
approved the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies within the county by a vote of 
44,403 in favor to 40,950 opposed. Of the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 
52% favored fluoridation; 48% opposed fluoridation. 
3. On November 13, 2000, the duly constituted Board of Canvass certified the 
election results for the November 7, 2000 general election in Davis County. 
4. As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(2), on April 5, 
2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators of public water systems 
directing that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before May 1, 2002. 
5. Based on that order, water system operators in Davis County have been preparing 
to add fluoride in accordance therewith. To date, fluoride is in the water of approximately 25% 
of county residents. The Health Department has directed that remaining system operators be in 
full compliance not later than November 1, 2002. 
6. On May 8,2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-502, with defendant Davis County Clerk ("Clerk") to circulate an 
initiative petition ("Initiative Petition") which they titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation 
Acf requesting a "Repeal of prior action? that a re-vote on fluoridation be held, and that county 
voters again be asked the question, "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within 
Davis County?" 
7. Thereafter, the sponsors began circulating the Initiative Petition to registered 
voters within Davis County. In their initiative petition, the sponsors requested that it be 
submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to 
the legal voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejected 
the proposed law or took no action on it. 
8. After verifying the requisite number of signatures for a local initiative petition 
pursuant to the local initiative petition statute, Utah Code § 20A-7-501(2), defendant Clerk 
submitted the Initiative Petition to the Commission on July 9, 2002, for the Commission's further 
action as provided in § 20A-7-501(3). 
9. At its next scheduled meeting on August 6,2002, the Commission took no action 
on the petition, and the Clerk, upon the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the 
petition question on the general election ballot as required by Utah Code § 20A-7-501(3)(d). 
The facts set out above are undisputed. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. Under Utah law, a 
"party has standing if any one of three criteria is met: (1) the interests of the parties are adverse, 
and the party seeding relief has a legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) no one has a 
greater interest than that party and the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing is denied; or 
(3) the issues raised by the party are of great public importance and ought to be judicially 
resolved " State Ex Rel. M. W.. 12 P.3d 80, 83 (Utah 2000) (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County. 702 P.2d 451,454 (Utah 1985) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1150-51 (Utah 
1983)). The Court finds that all three of these criteria have been independently satisfied by 
plaintiff. 
The Court finds that plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation organized specifically to advocate 
the benefits of fluoridation in Davis County, and as stated in the affidavit of Beth Q. Beck, 
Ed.D., who was one of the original incorporators of plaintiff, that it was significantly involved in 
the 2000 county-wide vote on this issue; many of plaintiff's members are residents of Davis 
County. The Court finds that many members of the Davis County Board of Health and five 
Chairs of the Board of Health from 1998 through the end of 2000 were instrumental in forming 
and directing the activities of plaintiff, and that plaintiff was significantly involved in obtaining 
the legislative changes which enabled the Davis County Commission to place the fluoridation 
question on the 2000 ballot. The Court also finds that the Davis County Board of Health adopted 
a recommendation to pursue water fluoridation as a public health measure in 1998, and that 
members of the Board, in their private capacities, and others incorporated plaintiff in 1999 to 
promote the public acceptance of water fluoridation and to support the fluoridation policies of 
the Board as a community-based organization outside of and beyond the Board itself. If a legally 
insufficient petition to re-vote fluoridation were placed on the 2002 ballot, the due process rights 
of plaintiff's members would be violated. The Court finds these facts sufficient to confer upon 
plaintiff a unique and legally protectible interest in the controversy before the Court. 
Additionally, the Court finds that no party is likely to have a greater interest in this lawsuit than 
plaintiff, and the claims asserted by plaintiff do not make individual participation by plaintiffs 
members indispensable to a resolution of this lawsuit. Finally, the Court finds that the issues 
presented by plaintiff are of great public importance to the general public, Davis County voters 
and cities within Davis County who must implement fluoridation, and thus ought to be resolved 
by this Court. Therefore, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack 
of standing. 
II. Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss County Commissioners, 
Defendants also moved to dismiss the defendant County Commissioners as parties to this 
lawsuit. With respect to this issue, the Court is persuaded by the arguments contained in the 
defendants' memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Commission 
took no action concerning the Initiative Petition at issue in this case and had no role in placing 
the Initiative Petition on the ballot. Section 20A-7-501(d) requires the County Clerk, not the 
Commission, to submit the Initiative Petition to Davis County voters at the next general election. 
As such, the Commissioners are not proper parties to this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court grants 
defendants' motion to dismiss the Commissioners. 
EDL Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Request for Declaratory Relief. 
This lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right of the people to 
legislate directly. Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides for the people of the 
State of Utah to exercise their direct legislative power through initiatives and referenda. "Article 
VI, section 1 is not merely a grant of the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees 
the initiative power to the people." Gallivan v. Walker. 2002 UT 89, U 23, P.3d 
(citations omitted). "The power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate 
through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share 'equal 
dignity.'" IdL at H 23 (citations omitted). "Because the people's right to directly legislate through 
initiative and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it against 
encroachment and maintain it inviolate." Id at U 27 (citations omitted). 
While the Court is well aware of the importance of direct legislation in our constitutional 
framework, it is equally cognizant of the fundamental principle of majority rule. "Our system of 
government is premised on the notion of majority rule with minority rights. Majority rule is the 
foundational premise of both of the constitutionally mandated mechanisms of enacting 
legislation." Id at ^  60. This principle of majority rule is inextricably linked to the mechanisms 
by which people may initiate direct legislation. Under Utah law, the people's right to legislate 
directly is set forth in two distinct mechanisms. First, if the people wish to exercise their 
legislative power to enact a law or ordinance, they are required to follow the requirements 
applicable to initiatives. See Utah Const. Art. VI, § 1 (2) (b) (i); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-501 et 
seq. ("Local Initiatives - Procedures"). Second, if the people wish to exercise their legislative 
power to suspend or repeal a law or an ordinance, they are required to follow the requirements 
applicable to referenda. See Utah Const. Art. VI, § 2 (b) (ii); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601 et 
seq. ("Local Referenda - Procedures"). Hence, while the people's right to initiate direct 
legislation is sacrosanct, the procedures for exercising that right are precise because the right of 
direct legislation was not meant to frustrate majority rule but rather to carry it out. 
By its own terms, the Initiative Petition at issue in this lawsuit seeks nothing more than a 
re-vote on a binding fluoridation opinion question that was already approved by a majority of 
Davis County voters in November, 2000, pursuant to the mechanism set forth in Section 19-4-
111 of the Utah Code. Since the voters of Davis County have already legislated the fluoridation 
of water in Davis County in the November 2000 general election, and because the Petition 
requests nothing more than to repeal that decision, the appropriate mechanism for the petition 
sponsors to challenge the legislative action of the majority of Davis County voters was through 
the referendum process. 
The plain language of the Initiative Petition is entitled "Re-vote on Mandatory 
Fluoridation Act" requests a "Repeal of prior action" and asks voters the identical question that 
was asked in November of 2000: "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within 
Davis County? " Thus, the Court finds that the Initiative Petition seeks to do precisely what the 
power of referendum is reserved for — the rejection of legislation that has already been adopted. 
To allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda 
provisions in the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless and allow the petition 
sponsors to subvert the important time requirements established by the State Legislature for 
referenda. Accordingly, because the Initiative Petition must in substance be classified as a local 
referendum, the Court finds that the Petition is untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601(3).1 
The Court's decision is also guided by the time-line set forth by plaintiffs counsel at the 
hearing held on September 13, 2002. On May 1, 2000, Senate Bill 158 became effective, 
amending Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111 by authorizing second-class counties to vote on 
fluoridation via the Commission's resolution. At that point, fluoridation of the water systems in 
Davis County was not permitted unless the people voted in favor of it. On July 26, 2000, the 
Davis County Commission adopted a resolution placing the fluoridation opinion question on the 
1
 The defendants also concede that if the Court construes the Initiative Petition as a 
referendum, the petition sponsors have not complied with the law governing referenda. See 
Defendants1 Memorandum In Opposition, p.5. 
Davis County November, 2000 general election ballot. Thereafter, on November 7,2000, voters 
in Davis County approved the fluoridation of Davis County water systems by a margin of 52% to 
48%, thereby rendering the fluoridation of water systems in Davis County legal pursuant to the 
mechanism established under state law in Utah Code § 19-4-111. At the moment the Board of 
Canvass certified the election results on November 13, 2000, the 2000 vote approving 
fluoridation became a legislative enactment pursuant to Utah Code § 19-4-111. Because the 
Court considers the 2000 vote to be a legislative enactment, the enactment may only properly be 
challenged by timely filing of a referendum petition. Both sides concede that a timely 
referendum petition was not filed in this case. The failure to timely file is fatal to a referendum 
petition's legal viability. See Bigler v. Vernon, 855 P.2d 1390,1392 (Utah 1993) ("We have 
emphasized previously the importance of strict compliance with the time limits contained in this 
[referendum] provision (citations omitted)... This requirement serves the salutary purpose of 
allowing the government and the public to rely on an ordinance as soon as the thirty-day period 
expires."). 
Even if viewed as an initiative, the Petition as submitted is an inappropriate mechanism 
to change the law of fluoridation within Davis County. First, the plain language of Section 19-4-
111 of the Utah Code makes no provision for a re-vote once the question of fluoridation has been 
answered in the affirmative by a majority of county voters. Nowhere in the state law is the 
Commission (or county voters) given authority to reverse the voters' binding opinion vote 
regarding water fluoridation once voter approval has been given. 
Second, under the precise terms of the statute, there is a joint legislative role between the 
Utah State Legislature and the voters of the county. Once the voters of the county are asked to 
respond to a resolution that the Commission has placed on the ballot, the voters' affirmative 
decision becomes incorporated into the state law. In the instant case, once fluoridation had been 
approved by a majority of Davis County voters in the November 7, 2000 general election, that 
decision was incorporated into the penumbra of Utah Code § 19-4-111, which in effect 
established a "new" state law on November 13,2000 when the vote was certified by the Board of 
Canvass. Because the voter approval process of Section 19-4-111 is a state law, it cannot be 
changed by a local initiative. If citizens of a county desire to change a decision to fluoridate 
their water systems, their only appropriate remedy to change the process is either to file a 
statewide initiative pursuant to Section 20A-7-301 or to seek a statutory change from the Utah 
State Legislature. As a result, the Court finds that the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow 
the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law 
governing initiatives and referenda. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court also finds that plaintiff is entitled to a permanent 
injunction enjoining the defendant Clerk from placing the Initiative Petition on the upcoming 
general election ballot. Plaintiff has prevailed on the merits of its underlying claims against 
defendant Clerk. Additionally, the Court finds that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm 
unless a permanent injunction was issued. Allowing the Initiative Petition to be placed on the 
ballot would subvert the efforts of plaintiffs members and Davis County voters by allowing the 
petition sponsors to misuse the people's direct legislative power to thwart the will of a majority 
of Davis County voters. Plaintiffs members and supporters spent substantial time and sums of 
money to comply with the legal and technical requirements governing the addition of fluoride to 
public water systems. To allow an unlawful Initiative Petition to proceed to the ballot box and 
potentially undo a lawful vote on fluoridation in the 2000 election would cause a level of harm to 
plaintiff, its members and Davis County voters that could not be adequately compensated in 
monetary damages alone. Plaintiffs only real remedy in the case is injunctive relief. 
The Court further finds that the harm suffered by plaintiff would significantly outweigh 
any remote injury defendant may suffer from the injunction. The injunction merely asks the 
Clerk to perform an official function of ceasing from printing and distributing election ballots 
containing an unlawful Initiative Petition. In contrast, the very integrity of the people's direct 
legislative power is at issue for plaintiff. If the Court allowed the Initiative Petition to be placed 
on the ballot, the lawful vote of a majority of Davis County residents would be nullified by a 
local initiative that this Court has deemed unlawfiil and untimely. Any reasonable balancing of 
the damages, therefore, weighs in favor of issuing a permanent injunction. 
The Court also finds that issuing a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff would not be 
adverse to the public interest. While the Court recognizes and respects the people's right to 
initiate direct legislation, the public, and Davis County voters in particular, have a real and 
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed 
and the election process adheres to the rule of law. Because of the important and unique issues 
involved in this lawsuit, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision, the Court 
finds that the public interest is advanced by issuing an injunction. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES and ADJUDGES as 
follows: 
1. The defendants' motion to consolidate the trial on the merits with the preliminary 
injunction hearing is GRANTED. 
2. The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing is DENIED. 
3. The defendants' motion to dismiss the County Commissioners as parties is 
GRANTED. 
4. The affidavit of Lewis Garrett is ADMITTED into evidence based upon the 
stipulation of the parties. 
5. The issue of plaintiffs attorneys5 fees is reserved by the Court for a later decision 
subject to plaintiffs filing of a motion and supporting memorandum. 
6. The plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Davis County 
Clerk from placing the Initiative Petition on the ballot is GRANTED and made permanent. 
7. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Clerk on all causes of 
action shall be entered. 
DATED this \S_ day of October, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
0 ^ U ^ ;i?v 
Judge Glen R/p^sonv ;-. >\ 
Second Judicial district Coiffr:! 
• * * * • * • 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Gerald E. Hess 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of October, 2002,1 delivered the foregoing Ruling to 
the Clerk of the Second Judicial District Court, and that I faxed a true and correct copy of the 
same to Gerald Hess, Esq. at (801) 451-4348. 
vX 
Tab 2 
MELVIN C.WILSON -3513 
Davis County Attorney 
GERALD E. HESS -1475 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
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Farmington UT 84025 
Tel: (801) 451-4300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH 
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, 
Steve S. Rawlings, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 020801343 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
The above-entitled matter having come on for an evidentiary hearing on the 7th 
day of August, 2003, before the above-entitled Court at 8:30 a.m. in Bountiful, Utah, the 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson, District Judge, presiding,.and the Plaintiffs appearing by and 
through their attorneys David R. Irvine and Janet Jenson, and the Defendant Steve Rawlings, 
Findings of fact conclusions of law and < 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor, also appearing in person and through his attorney Melvin C 
Wilson, Davis County Attorney, and the Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and 
further having reviewed the pleadings and having heard and considered the arguments of the 
attorneys for the parties herein, and the Court previously on October 15, 2002, having entered its 
ruling relating to all issues in the proceedings with the exception of the issue of attorney's fees, 
and the Plaintiff and Defendant having withdrawn their respective motions pursuant to Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court now being fully advised in the premises 
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant, Steve Rawlings, is the elected Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
and is the chief election officer for Davis County and occupied that position during the time 
periods relevant to the issues before the Court. 
2. The defendant conducted the 2000 general election and pursuant to resolutions 
enacted by the Davis County Commission did cause a countywide proposal concerning whether 
fluoride should be added to the drinking water of the residents of Davis County to be placed on 
the ballot. In addition to the resolution he did cause a voter information pamphlet to be 
published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation and did insert in the front 
of the pamphlet information supplied to him by some cities and Weber Basin Water District on 
estimated costs to fluoridate County water systems. 
3. The Court has previously entered factual findings in the prior ruling entered on 
October 15, 2002, and such are incorporated by reference into the findings herein. 
4. Additionally the Court finds that the defendant Clerk/Auditor sought the legal 
advice of Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney Gerald Hess at all stages of the initiative process 
and followed the legal advice of counsel and that he performed his duties and responsibilities as 
the Clerk/Auditor thought appropriate and in conformance with his good faith understanding of 
what the law was at the time. 
5. The Court finds that Defendants Clerk/Auditor and Commissioners followed 
the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon their interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes UCA 20A-7-501 et seq., and UCA 19-4-111 of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, and documents filed by the initiative sponsors. 
6. The Court finds that there is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication of 
duties on the part of the Clerk/Auditor or Commissioners in the events of 2002 and the 
suggestions of bias from events in 2000-2001 are simply not persuasive that the Clerk/Auditor 
abused or exceeded the scope of his authority as a public official. 
7. The Court finds that there was no evidence that the actions of the County 
Government was an attempt to subvert the rights of those who voted in 2000 and that even 
though the voting rights are a significant issue in the context of this case, such significance does 
not rise to the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 885 P2d 759 (Utah 1994). 
8. The Court further finds that the evidence is insufficient to support an award of 
attorney's fees as to the other judgment alternatives set forth in the Stewart decision, supra, in 
that the litigation did not lesult in any common fund being created from which attorney's fees 
can be paid, nor does the case, in the absence of evidence of bad faith, constitute an 
extraordinary case, rather the Court finds that the case is unique and is a case of first impression, 
but not of the extraordinary nature as envisioned in the Stewart decision. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
1. There is no evidence of any bad faith or abdication of official duties and 
responsibilities by the Davis County Clerk/Auditor, Davis County Commissioners or other 
county government officials concerning the events of 2002 in respect to the initiative petition. 
2. The Clerk/Auditor and County Commissioners were in good faith simply 
involved in following the advice of legal counsel and taking a legal position based upon their 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, applicable statutes and documents filed by the sponsors 
of the initiative petition in 2002. 
3. The evidence adduced by Plaintiff is insufficient to support any award of 
attorney's fees under any of the alternatives pursuant to the Private Attorney General Doctrine 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Public Service Commission, 885 P2d 759 
(Utah 1994) and the Plaintiff should be denied any judgment for attorney's fees. However 
Plaintiff, pursuant to 78-33-10 UCA, should be awarded judgment for costs incurred herein in 
the amount of $267.15. 
ORDER 
The Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
hereby enters the following Order. 
1. The prior ruling of the Court entered October 15, 2002 is incorporated herein 
and upon entry is made final. 
2. The Plaintiff is hereby denied any award for attorney's fees. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant for costs incurred in 
the amount of $267,15. 
,2003. Ordered this 4^  day of _ 
By the Court 
Approved as to form: 
^^^J^iurf^ 
David R. Irvine 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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UBDH v. DAVIS COUNTY COM'N 
Cite as 121 P.3d 39 (UtahApp 2005) 
Utah 3 9 
censure status was irrelevant to the Lees' 
tort claims against him. We are unconvinced 
that any error in the exclusion of this evi-
dence resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a 
different outcome for the Lees. Accordingly, 
any error is harmless. 
J14] 1124 The Lee's remaining arguments 
address issues relating to Thorpe and Rang-
er's vicarious liability for the actions of Lang-
ley, All of:the Lees' tort claims, against 
Langley were rejected either by the trial 
court or by the jury, and we have affirmed 
those decisions on, appeal. Vicarious liability 
does not exist apart from the liability of some 
putative primary tortfeasor, m this case 
Langley. See Mann u Wad$worth> 776 P2d 
92& 928-29 <ytah CtApp.1989) ("[g]ince 
W t^fciss & Campbell's liability under respofl-
de^t superior is vicarious* it 4oe$ not exist 
apart from Wadsvyorth's liability. The jury 
held Wadsworth not liable, and the same 
result must, therefore, also obtain for Wat-
kiss & Campbell."). Accordingly, because 
Qie Lees could not establish liability against 
Langley, they could not establish vicarious 
liability against Thorpe or Ranger as a mat-
ter of law. Any &ror in th£ trial court's 
i-efusal to default Thorpe 4 dr admit the re-
ceipt signed by Thorpe into evidence there-
fore could not have been reasonably likely to 
affect the outcome of the proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
f 25 The trial court properly concluded 
that Lee could not dispute Langleys authori-
ty to arrest him under the bail contract 
despite Langley's lack of a Utah bail enforce-
ment agent license. The trial court*also 
properly dismissed both George and Gerald 
Lee's claims for false imprisonment. The 
Lees' other claims of error constitute, at 
most, harmless error. 
% 26 Accordingly, we affirm. 
4. "There is an important distinction between a 
default and a default judgrrient[,]" and "the entry 
of a default does not automatically entitle a 
plaintiff to a default judgment for the damages 
claimed m the complaint Skanchy v Calcados 
Ortope SA, 952 P 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) 
' To entei a default judgment for unliquidated 
damages a judge must review the complaint 
determine whether the allegations state a valid 
H27ICONCUK: 
JACKSON, Judge. 
NORMAN H. 
1281 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL 
HEALTH-DAVIS, INC., a Utah hon^of« 
it corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DAVIS COJJ^TY COMMISSION, Commis-
sioner Dan RrJMcConkie, Commissioner 
Carpi $. Page> Commissioner Michael J . 
Cragup, Davis ^County Clerk, and Steve 
& Rawlings? Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20030940-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 11, 2005. 
Background: Group supporting water 
fluoridation brought suit against county, 
seeking declaration that petition seeking-
another vote on fluoridation issue, and its 
placement on ballot, was unlawful. The 
Second District Court, Bountiful Depart-
ment, Glen R. Dawson, J., granted group's 
request for injunction, but denied group's 
motion tot attorney fees. Group appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thome, 
J., held that action would be remanded for 
additional findings required to support de-
nial of attorney fees. 
Remanded. 
claim for relief, and award damages in an 
amount that is supported by some valid evi-
dence " Id In this case, even if Thorpe had been 
defaulted, the Lees' complaint does not ' state a 
valid claim for relief' against him in light of the 
jury's verdLct in favor of his alleged agent, Lang 
ley Id Accordingly no judgment would ever 
have been entered against Thorpe even if he had 
been defaulted 
40 Utah 121 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>984(5) 
The appropriate standard for reviewing 
equitable awards of attorney fees is abuse of 
discretion. 
2. Costs <©=*194.16 
Utah generally follows the traditional 
American rule that attorney fees cannot be 
recovered by a prevailing party unless a 
statute or contract authorizes such an award; 
however, in the absence of a statutory or 
contractual authorization, a court has inher-
ent equitable power to awaiti reasonable at-
ton^r fees when, it deems it appropriate^ 
the interests of justice and equity. 
3. C&Hs &*194.42 
Among the methods of granting an equi-
table award of attorney fees is the private 
attorney general doctrine, under ttfhibn 
courts have awarded attorney fees to a psldrty 
as a "private attorney gerferaP' ^keu* the 
vindication of a strong or societaHy imgbft&nt 
public policy takes ]?lace &nd the iied£sfcary 
costs in doing §o transcend the individual 
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent re-
quiring subsidization. 
4. Costs e=*208 
Reviewing court insists that si trial 
courts decision concerning a motion for, the 
award of attorney fees be supported by ade-
quate findings, for which they tnust show 
that the court's judgfnent or decree follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evi-
dence, and they shotild be sufficiently de-
tailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate con-
clusion on each factual issue was -reached, 
5. Appeal and Error <3=*1178(6) 
Reviewing court would remand action to 
trial court for additiohal findings TegaMing 
water fluoridation group's request for attor-
ney fees under private attorney general's 
doctrine in obtaining an injunction to bar 
placing initiative seeking vote to rescind ear-
lier fluoridation approval for county water 
system; trial court failed to make findings as 
to whether group's lawsuit was vindicating a 
strong or societally important public policy 
and that its action transcended its own pecu-
niary interest to an extent that required 
subsidization, and whether t h e action 
amounted to an extraordinary case. 
Janet I. Jenson and David R. Irvine, Jen-
son & Stavros, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Melvin C. Wilson, Farmington, a n d David 
B. Thompson, Miller Vance & Thompson t C , 
Park City, for Appellees. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and 
THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
HI Utahns for Better Dental Health-
Davis, Inc. (UBDH) appeals the trial court's 
denial of their request for attoHiey fees pur-
suant to the private attorney general doc-
trine. We remand for additional ftndiiigs. 
BACKGROUND 
1f2 UBDH Tjvas organized tp support ef-
forts to fluoridate the water in Davis County 
for the purpose of promoting better dental 
health. In p^rt due to UBDH's efforts, 
Davis County voters were presented with a 
fluoridation initiative in 2000, which was ap-
proved by a majority of the voters. In 2001, 
Davis County began implementing the vot-
ers' decision and ordered all operators of 
public water systems to add fluoride to their 
water supply beginning no later than May 
2002. In July 2002, the County Clerk, Steve 
Rawlings, accepted a petition calling for an-
other vote on the fluoridation issue. He 
deterpiined that the .petition had a sufficient 
number of verified signatures; consequently, 
he certified the petition as an initiative peti-
tion and forwarded it to the County Commis-
sion. The Commission allowed the petition 
to go on the ballot, without opposing com-
mentary, and soon thereafter UBDH filed an 
action seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the petition—and its placement on the bal-
lot—was unlawful and unconstitutional. 
UBDH also sought an order enjoining Davis 
County from placing the issue on the ballot 
11 3 The trial court determined that the so 
called initiative petition was actually a refer-
endum, and that as such, it had not been filed 
UBDH v. DAVIS COUNTY COM'N 
Cite as 121 P.3d 39 (UtahApp 2005) 
Utah 4 1 
timely. Moreover, the court determined that 
the petition would not have been lawful as an 
initiative petition. Consequently, the court 
concluded that the decisions of the Clerk and 
the Commission to place the issue on the 
ballot were unlawfiil and unconstitutional-and 
granted UBDH a permanent injunction bar-
ring the county from placing this particular 
petition on the ballot 
114 UBDH then filed a motion for attorney 
fe^, which the county opposed. In August 
2Q03, the trial court h^ld a hearing on the 
matter and then briefly took it u^er^adv^e-
inent. The court issued an oral
 t decision 
denying the motion for fees and requested 
t^at the County Attorney draft the order. 
UBDH was not satisfied witl^  the county^s 
proposed order and drafted its own alterna-
tive order, which it then submitted to the 
trial court. On October 3, 2003, .after review-
ing th{e competing draft orders, the trial 
court accepted the county's version with cer-
tain modifications. UBDH now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 115 UBDH argues that the trial court 
erred in denying its request for attorney fees 
pursuant to the private attorney general doc-
trine. "[T]he appropriate standard for re-
viewing equitable awards of attorney fees is 
abuse of discretion," Hughes v. Cafferty, 
2004 UT 22,1120,89 P.3d 148. 
ANALYSIS 
[2,3] 16 UBDH argues that its efforts to 
force Davis County to act in conformance 
with the law were required by the actions of 
the County Clerk and the County Commis-
sion; thus, the trial court erred in denying 
UBDH's motion for attorney fees "In gen-
eral, Utah follows the traditional American 
rule that attorney fees cannot be recovered 
by a prevailing party unless a statute or 
contract authorizes such an award " Hughes 
v Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, U 21, 89 P.3d 148 
" 'However, in the absence of a statutory or 
contractual authorization, a court has inher-
ent equitable power to award reasonable at-
torney fees when it deems it appropriate m 
the interests of justice and equity'" Id 
(quoting Stewart v Public Serv Comm'n, 
885 P 2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994)) 
Among the methods of granting an equita-
ble award of attorney fees [recognized in 
Utah] is a doctrine known as the "private 
attorney general." Under this doctrine, 
"[clourts . . . have awarded attorney fees 
to a party as a 'private attorney general* 
when the Vindication of a strong or soeie-
taljy important public policy' takes place 
and the necessary costs in doing so ' tran-
scend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary 
interest to an extent requiring subsidiza-
tion.' " 
Shipmati v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 128, 100 
P.3d 1151 (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). iHowever, fees awarded under this 
docthne are not ohly unusual, but they &tfe 
awarded ohly in extraordinary cases. See id 
at K 24*-< Thfc determination of whether a case 
ris& to this level is preliminarily left to the 
discretion of the trial court, and "we will not 
undertake otir own assessment tit whether 
[UBDH's actions] vindicated a public policy* 
nor will we attempt to gauge anew the im-
portance of any vindicated policy." Id at 
f 25. Our review, then, is ultimately only4o 
determine if the trial court exceeded the 
permitted range of its discretion. 
[4] ^ 7 We do, however, insist that a trial 
court's decision concerning a motion for the 
award of attorney fees be supported by ade-
quate findings. See J. Pochynok Co. v. 
Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 1113, 116 £ .3d 353. 
Moreover, 
{f]er findings of fact to be adequate, they 
"must show that the court's judgment or 
decree 'follows logically from, and is sup-
ported by, the evidence.' The findings 
'should be sufficiently detailed and iftcludd 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached.'" 
Armed Forces Ins Exch v. Harrison, 2003 
UT 14, 1128, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Acton v 
Dehran, 737 P 2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)); see 
also Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev Corp v 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co, 909 P.2d 
225, 232 (Utah 1995) In the absence of 
adequate findings, which eliminates our abili-
ty to "get a clear understanding of the basis 
of the trial court's judgment," we must re-
mand the issue for further findings 5 Am 
42 Utah 121 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
Jur.2d Appellate Review § 688 (1995); see 
also Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at 1128, 70 P.3d 
35. 
[5] 1t 8 UBDH filed a motion in the trial 
court requesting attorney fees under the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine. UDBH ar-
gued that by filing, 'and prevailing in, its 
Action to enjoin Davis County from placing 
the issue on the ballot, it was vindicating a 
" 'strong or societally important public poli-
cy' " and that its action "*trancend[ed its 
own] pecuniary interest to an extent requir-
ing subsidization/ " (quoting Stewart v. pub-
lic Sew. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759* 783 (Utah 
1994)). The trial court held an ^videjitjary 
hearing on the iss^e, following whicji it is-
sued its decision denying UBDH's daipi. 
A 9 Its decision, however, intermingles ele-
ments of many of the various equitable doc-
trines by which a party might qualify lor 
attorney fees. Moreover, the trial court did 
not specifically ad(}ress UBDIJ's private at-
torney general doctrine claim. In particular, 
the trial court did not enter adequate find-
ings concerning JJBDETs claipi that its ef-
forts vindicated a societally important public 
policy. See Stewart, 885 P.2d #t 783. The 
trial court also failed to address whether 
UBDH's action transcended its Own pecuni-
ary interests to an extent requiring subsidi-
zation. See id Finally, although the trial 
court did find that UBDH's action did not 
amount to an extraordinary case, see id, it 
did so after concluding that the case'was 
"unique," and that it involved "significant 
[voting rights] issues." We find it impossible 
to reconcile these opposing views without 
further factual support for, and an explana-
tion of, the trial court's ultimate conclusion. 
1110 Because these absent finding^ are es-
sential to our review of the trial court's deci-
sion, we conclude that the trial court's factual 
findings are inadequate Moreover, "[s]ince 
it is not within our realm of authority to 
make such findings," Harrison, 2003 UT 14 
at H 32, 70 P.3d 35, we have no choice but to 
remand this case to the trial court for the 
entry of additional findings on these specific 
issues 
1111 On remand, the trial court is instruct 
ed to enter appropriate findings given its 
assessment of the evidence of record and 
then to enter* conclusions consistent with 
those findings. The court must articulate 
sufficient subsidiary factual findings to illu-
tninate and inform its eventual conclusion 
regarding UBDH's petition for attorney fees 
pursuant to the private attorney general doc-
trine. 
CONCLUSION 
112 Eligibility tot an award of attorney 
fees undei* the private attorney general doc-
trine" is contingent upon the petitioner satis-
fying 'Several settled factors. However, the 
trial court retains the discretion to deny the 
request for fees. Whether the t r ia l court 
awards ot denies the requested fees, it must 
support its decision with sufficient factual 
findings to provide a basis for its decision. 
In this case, the trial court failed t o enter 
adequate subsidiary findings to justify its 
ultimate conclusion and in doing so eliminat-
ed our ability to meaningfully review the 
decision and ensure that the court has not 
abused its discretion. 
H13 Accordingly, we remand this case to 
the trial court,for the entry of adequate 
findings and legal conclusions and a decision 
consistent with those findings and conclu-
sions. 
1114 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M, 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and 
GREGORY K ORME, Judge. 
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Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON 
BACKGROUND 
This matter is before the Court on *'Plaintiff s Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
Costs" filed November 7, 2002. Defendant's "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Request 
for Attorneys' Fees" was filed November 14,2002, and "Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs" was filed November 25,2002. A 
"Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for Oral Argument" was filed by Plaintiffs counsel 
on December 11, 2002, and pursuant to a telephone scheduling conference on January 21, 2003, 
the matter was originally set for oral argument on February 27, 2003. 
After a series of subsequent filings and a number of conferences by the Court with 
counsel, an evidentiary hearing was ultimately held on August 7, 2003, and oral findings and 
conclusions were made by the Court on August 8, 2003. On October 2, 2003, the Court entered 
an order denying Plaintiffs fees request. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the 
matter back to this Court for additional findings and the current decision is in response to the 
Court of Appeals' request. This ruling is based on a review of the applicable case law as argued 
by the parties, the evidence presented in the evidentiary hearing held on August 7, 2003, and the 
factual findings contained in the Court's prior ruling entered October 15, 2002, which findings 
are incorporated herein by reference. The Court intends that the findings and conclusions in this 
decision will supplant the oral findings and conclusions made on August 8,2003, and the 
findings, conclusions and order entered October 2,2003. The Court further intends that, to the 
extent the current findings conflict with earlier oral or written pronouncements by this Court, this 
decision should control as it relates to the issue of attorney fees. 
ANALYSIS 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 
P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted), that: 
The general rule in Utah, and the traditional American rule, subject to certain 
exceptions, is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a 
statute or contract authorizes such an award.... However, in the absence of a 
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to 
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity. . 
The Stewart Court recognized several categories of cases in which courts have exercised their 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees. This Court will address these 
categories in analyzing whether it is appropriate to exercise this equitable power in the current 
case. 
First, the Stewart Court recognized that the equitable power has been exercised when a 
party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting James W. 
Moore et al , Moore's Federal Practice P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). In this Court's view, much of the 
2 
evidence provided by Plaintiff at the August 7,2003, evidentiary hearing was presented to show 
that Defendant acted in bad faith and that Defendant was biased and prejudiced against those 
who favored fluoridation in the county's drinking water. After reviewing the evidence presented, 
the Court finds that Defendant did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons, as will be explained below. 
The Defendant, at all relevant times, was the elected Davis County Clerk/Auditor and 
served as the chief election officer for Davis County. He conducted the 2000 general election 
and pursuant to resolutions enacted by the Davis County Commission caused a countywide 
proposal concerning whether fluoride should be added to the drinking water of the residents of 
Davis County to be placed on the ballot. In addition to the resolution, he caused a voter 
information pamphlet to be published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation 
and inserted in the front of the pamphlet information supplied to him by some cities and the 
Weber Basin Water District on estimated costs to fluoridate county water systems. In the general 
election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County approved the addition of fluoride 
to the public water supplies within the county by a vote of 44,403 in favor to 40,950 opposed. Of 
the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 52% favored fluoridation and 48% 
opposed fluoridation. As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Annotated (UCA) Section 
19-4-111(2), on April 5, 2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators 
of public water systems directing that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before 
May 1,2002. 
On May 8, 2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, pursuant to UCA 
§ 20A-7-502, with the Defendant to circulate an initiative petition ("Initiative Petition") which 
3 
tfey titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" requesting a "[rjepeal of prior action." 
Sfecifically, the petition proposed that a re-vote on fluoridation be held, and that county voters 
ajain be asked the question, "[s]hould fluoride be added to the public water supplies within 
Dtvis County?" Thereafter, the sponsors began circulating the Initiative Petition to registered 
voters within Davis County. In their Initiative Petition, the sponsors requested that it be 
submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to 
the legal voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election, if the County Commission rejected 
the proposed law or took no action on it. After verifying the requisite number of signatures for a 
local initiative petition pursuant to the local initiative petition statute, UCA § 20A-7-501(2), 
Defendant submitted the Initiative Petition to the Commission on July 9, 2002, for the 
Commission's further action as provided in UCA § 20A-7-501(3). At its next scheduled meeting 
on August 6, 2002, the Commission took no action on the Initiative Petition, and the Defendant, 
upon the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the petition question on the general 
election ballot as required by UCA § 20A-7-501(3)(d). The instant lawsuit followed. 
With regard to whether the Defendant acted in bad faith, this Court finds that the 
Defendant sought the legal advice of Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney, Gerald Hess, at all 
stages of the initiative process and performed his duties and responsibilities as the Clerk/Auditor 
in conformance with his good faith understanding of what the law was at the time. Furthermore, 
Defendant followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon 
counsel's interpretation of the May 8, 2001, petition filed by the Davis County citizen's group in 
conjunction with the Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes (UCA § 20A-7-501 et seq) and 
UCA § 19-4-111. There is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication of duties on the part of 
4 
tie Defendant in the events of 2002. The suggestions of bias from the events in 2000-2001 
nised by Plaintiff at the August 2003, evidentiary hearing do not persuade the Court that the 
Defendant abused or exceeded the scope of his authority as a public official Further, there was 
ID evidence that the actions of the Defendant constituted an attempt to subvert the rights of those 
vho voted in 2000, as suggested by Plaintiff. 
In the Court's view, this case did not involve bad faith or an abdication of duties by 
government officials. It simply involved government officials following the advice of legal 
counsel, taking a good faith legal position based on their interpretation of the document filed by 
tie initiative sponsors and applicable statutes. This case was a case of first impression for both 
tie County Clerk and his attorney, as well as the Court as it relates to the appropriate 
interpretation of UCA § 19-4-111 and citizen filings made pursuant to that statute.1 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart recognized that "an award of attorney fees is 
common in class action cases when nonparty class members are financially benefitted as a result 
of the efforts of a few litigants who successfully create a fund that benefits the entire class." 885 
P,2d at 782. (citations omitted). This exception, often referred to as the "common fund" theory, 
is typically applied when the activities of a party have resulted in the creation or preservation of a 
fund of money out of which the fees are to be paid. In the present case, of course, there was no 
monetary award and no "fund" was created or maintained by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court 
cannot use its equitable power to award attorney fees under the "common fund" theory. 
In reference to this second category, the Stewart Court explained in a footnote that 
Since the Court's ruling in October 2002, UCA § 19-4-111 has been clarified by the Legislature to allow a 
new vote on the issue after four years. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(5) (2005). 
5 
"[a]ncjier expression of the inherent equitable power of a court to award attorney fees is 
recognized when a plaintiffs litigation confers 'a substantial benefit on the members of an 
ascertainable class.'" Id. at n.18 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (citations omitted)). 
In explaining this "substantial benefit" exception in footnote 18, the Stewart court quoted from 
the California Supreme Court's decision in Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303,1309 (Cal. 1977). 
The Serrano court opined that the "substantial benefit" exception may be viewed as an offshoot 
of the "common fund" doctrine and "permits the award of fees when the litigant, proceeding in a 
representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a 'substantial benefit' of a 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." Id. The idea is that the court, in the exercise of its equitable 
discretion, "may decree that under dictates of justice those receiving the benefit should contribute 
to the costs of its production." IdL A brief review of this theory as analyzed in the Serrano case 
and its potential application in this case will follow. 
In Serrano, plaintiffs' attorneys (Public Advocates, Inc. and Western Center on Law and 
Poverty) submitted motions for the award of fees against defendants, officials of the State of 
California, under the "common fund," "substantial benefit," and "private attorney general" 
theories after the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court. The Superior Court had ruled that the then-existing California public school 
financing system was in violation of the state's constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1304. 
The plaintiffs in Serrano asserted that as a result of their litigation they conferred benefits 
upon the state defendants, millions of taxpayers, children who were enrolled in and attending 
public school, and the state itself. Id. at n. 11. The California Supreme Court agreed that findings 
6 
existed showing that the litigation produced benefits of a conceptual or doctrinal character and 
tven proposed that the plaintiffs had "rendered an enormous service to the state and all of its 
citizens" by insuring that the state educational financing system was brought into compliance 
vith the state constitution thereby enhancing equal educational opportunities for the children. Id. 
Jt 1312. Even the bestowal of these enormous benefits, however, did not create a sufficient basis 
br the equitable award of fees under the "substantial benefit" theory. The Court concluded that 
to "award fees under the 'substantial benefit' theory on the basis of considerations of this nature 
separate and apart from any consideration of actual and concrete benefits bestowed - would be 
to extend that theory beyond its rational underpinnings." Id. 
Applying the "substantial benefit" exception to the current case, the Court concludes that 
there has been no evidence presented by Plaintiff of a substantial pecuniary benefit bestowed by 
this litigation, and the Court further believes that any nonpecuniary benefit created by the 
Plaintiff in this litigation is insufficient to warrant an award of fees. Plaintiff maintains that it 
protected and vindicated the rights of the voters of Davis County by pursuing this action. In this 
Court's view, this service to the citizens is, at best, akin to the service provided by the plaintiffs 
in Serrano, absent of actual and concrete benefits, and therefore undeserving of equitable 
consideration. While Plaintiff asserts that its efforts vindicated the rights of the voters, their 
efforts can just as easily be viewed as supporting and protecting Plaintiffs personal views 
regarding the benefit of fluoridation. This entity was organized specifically to advocate the 
benefits of fluoridation in Davis County and to promote the public acceptance of water 
fluoridation. They most certainly furthered their cause by obtaining a ruling that effectively 
frustrated opponents of fluoridation from obtaining a re-vote on this issue in 2002. Further, an 
7 
argument can easily be made that only 52% of the voters in Davis County benefitted from the 
Court's interpretation in this action leaving the other 48% disenfranchised in their view. 
Doctrines of fairness and equity do not suggest that all citizens of Davis County, citizens almost 
evenly divided on the merits of a polarizing issue, should have to pay the attorney fees for the 
pro-fluoride advocates. 
The third category recognized in Stewart provides that courts have also used their 
equitable power to grant an award of attorney fees when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation 
of the trust and obtains recovery for all beneficiaries. 885 P.2d at 783. The case before this 
Court is not of this nature and therefore, the Court cannot use its equitable power to award 
attorney fees from this category. 
The last category recognized by the court in Stewart is the "private attorney general" 
doctrine. Id. The court's award of attorney fees in this category is considered when the 
"Vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs 
in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization.'" Id. (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314). In granting attorney fees under this 
doctrine the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart noted the limited applicability of this category. It 
said, "[W]e note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future award of 
attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case." Id. at n.19. 
In Stewart, petitioner and other telephone users and ratepayers brought suit against the 
Utah Public Service Commission and U.S. West Communications, challenging an order from the 
Commission that among other actions, increased respondent utility's authorized rate of return on 
equity to 12.2%. The issue before the court was whether the Commission could "increase the 
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luthorized rate of return on equity above a reasonable rate of return to induce a utility to make 
'discretionary' investments in its plant and equipment in Utah." Id. at 769-70. Specifically, the 
ratepayers challenged (1) the lawfulness of the 12.2% rate of return on equity and (2) the 
(Dnstitutionality of Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1 (1990), which authorized the Commission 
b approve the incentive rate regulation plans and allowed a utility to veto such plans. 
In ruling that a 12.2% rate of return on equity was not supported by the evidence, the 
Utah Supreme Court found, among other things, that the Public Service Commission had a 
history of "extraordinary abdication" of its statutory duties for a number of years. Id. at 774. 
Such abdication resulted in U.S. West Communications (USWC) earning "approximately 45% 
more than USWC's authorized rate of return" which amounted "to many tens of millions of 
dollars collected from ratepayers in excess of a fair return." Id. 
The Court also found that Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1(2) was unconstitutional 
because the statute illegally allowed for a delegation of legislative power to a private party. Id. at 
776. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
The Constitution does not confer a power on private parties to veto legislative acts. 
Nevertheless, § 54-4-4.1(2) purports not only to confer a veto power on a utility 
over a quasi-legislative act of the Commission, but it does so without establishing 
any standards governing its exercise... .[T]his Court has held that the Legislature 
cannot constitutionally delegate to private parties governmental power that can be 
used to further private interests contrary to the public interest. 
Id. at 775-76. 
In awarding fees the Supreme Court noted the exceptional nature of the case and focused 
on the substantial monetary benefits conferred on all ratepayers by plaintiffs' actions and the 
windfall obtained by respondent USWC. They found: 
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all USWC 
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ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of whether 
a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered. Here, USWC has 
collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was authorized by the 
Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order to retain revenues in excess 
of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs1 action, all that would have been 
unchallenged, and none of USWC's ratepayers would ever have had any relief. In 
the absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to 
require the shareholders of USWC to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney 
fees. See Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314. 
id. at 783-84. 
Turning to the current case, the first question is whether the plaintiff by this action has 
lindicated a strong or societally important public policy.2 In analyzing this question, the Court 
notes that the principal finding in this litigation was simply that the May 8, 2001, document was 
most appropriately interpreted as a local referendum and not as an initiative petition and was 
therefore untimely. While the Court recognizes that the people's right to directly legislate 
through initiative and referendum is an important and fundamental right, this Court is not 
iaclined to conclude that the mere interpretation of a contested petition involves "vindication of a 
strong or societally important public policy." Also, the fact that plaintiff accomplished personal 
interests by pursuing this matter disinclines the Court from finding that this factor has been met. 
Further, even if this criterion for fees had been met, there is no evidence that the 
necessary costs of the litigation "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an 
extent requiring subsidization." Id. at 783. There was no showing by Plaintiff during the 
evidentiary hearing of the necessity for private enforcement nor of the magnitude of the resultant 
burden on the plaintiff. There was no evidence of Plaintiff s ability to pay attorney fees without 
assistance. There was no showing whatsoever of Plaintiff s financial resources or interests. 
At the outset, an expression of fallibility is appropriate I am somewhat uncomfortable attempting to 
quantify the relative importance of the public policy involved in this litigation. I concede it may be best for the state 
legislature to determine which public policies are of sufficient importance to warrant an award of attorney fees. See 
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314-1315. 
There was no showing that the burden placed on Plaintiff in pursuing this litigation, even if 
necessary, was out of proportion to Plaintiffs individual stake in the matter. The burden to make 
such a factual showing was clearly on the Plaintiff. Without a sufficient factual showing 
regarding these matters, attorney fees cannot be allowed. 
Finally, in this Court's view, the current case is simply not of the exceptional nature or 
magnitude described in Stewart. While the case was unique to this Court because it was the first 
time this Court had been asked to interpret whether a particular document should be 
appropriately categorized as an initiative petition, it is not, in this Court's view, the extraordinary 
type of case envisioned by Stewart. First of all, there were no monetary benefits created by 
plaintiffs actions as in Stewart nor was there a windfall to Defendant. While these factors alone 
may not be controlling, this Court perceives that the significant monetary benefits related to 
future rates bestowed by the plaintiffs actions in Stewart were an important reason for the 
Court's decision regarding attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. Again, 
there are no such benefits in this case. This Court cannot even find actual or concrete benefits 
created in this case. Also, the magnitude and history of the abdication of duties by the Public 
Service Commission found in Stewart are lacking in this case. As the Court has previously 
found, the Davis County Clerk performed his duties in good faith following the advice of legal 
counsel. This is far different from the Stewart findings of a history of extraordinary abdication by 
the Commission of its statutory duties for a number of years.3 
All of these factors lead the Court to conclude that the "private attorney general" doctrine 
does not apply in this case. 
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While the Court recognized that Defendant's interpretation led to an inappropriate result as applied to the unique 
Initiative Petition in this case, this is far different from a finding that a state statute is unconstitutional 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes first, the Plaintiff did not present 
efficient evidence that the Defendant acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons. Second, Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the "common fund" 
tieory. In the alternative, Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that as a result of the 
Itigation there was a conferral of a "substantial benefit" of either a pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
nature that would warrant an equitable award of fees. Third, this case does not involve a 
leneficiaiy who sued a trustee for violation of the trust. Finally, Plaintiff rendered insufficient 
evidence to support an award of attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. 
The Court cannot conceive of any other approach that would allow this Court to use its 
quitable power to grant Plaintiffs attorneys5 fees in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees is denied. 
Dated February H , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
\ iX 
^.<3GEEN,& DAWSON 
^
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Contract Director 
June 29,2000 
Contractor Coordinator 
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Commissioner Page made a motion to authorize signing of the agreement and with a second from Commis-
sioner Stevenson, this motion carried. 
Voucher For 
Use of 
Landfill 
Available 
Commissioner McConkie referred to a letter from Wasatch Energy indicating that effective October 
1,2000 vouchers would be available in the cities for residents to use die energy recovery district and land fill 
areas for $5.00. These vouchers will also be available through June of 2001. 
Resolution 
#2000-191 
Re: Vote On 
Fluoride 
Adopted 
Commissioner McConkie read the following Resolution regarding the fluoride issue: 
#2000-191 
RESOLUTION 
A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE 
PLACEMENT ON THE BALLOT THE OPINION 
QUESTION RELATING TO FLUORIDATION OF 
ALL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS WITHIN DAVIS COUNTY 
WHEREAS, the Davis County has received a request from the Davis County Health Department that 
it adopt a resolution placing on the ballot at the next general election the opinion question relating to 
fluoridation of all public water systems within Davis County; and 
WHEREAS, Richard Harvey, Interim Health Director and Head of the Environmental Health and 
Laboratory Division of the Davis County Health Department, has issued his report concluding that all public 
water systems in Davis County are not functionally separate systems; and 
WHEREAS, representatives from the Davis County Board of Health indicate that most of the water 
systems in Davis County are so interconnected that one system could not fluoridate its water without having 
an effect o the other systems surrounding it; and 
W! IEREAS, Senator Edgar Allen, the sponsor of Senate Bill 158, has explained that his intent in 
adoptinf : legislation was to require a county-wide vote on the issue of fluoridation in counties where water 
systems $L re water with each other and are not independent from each other; and 
V* 8REAS, Keidi M. Woodwell, Associate General Counsel of the Office of Legislative Research 
and Gene. Counsel, has opined that he legislature intended in Senate Bill 158 to require a county-wide vote 
on fluoride * m unless separate public water systems existed with independent water supplies and not 
receiving \ ter from any other water supply from anodier public water system; and 
W 3REAS, based upon information received from the Davis County Health Department, there are 
no function ly separate water systems in Davis County, therefore, any vote on fluoridation should be a 
county-wia. vote without the requirement of counting the votes separately in any municipal water system or 
district watw system. 
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of County Commissioners of Davis County as 
follows: 
1. Pursuant to Section 19-4-111, Utah Code Ann., as amended by Senate Bill 158 adopted 
during the 2000 general session of the Utah State Legislature, the Davis County Commission directs that an 
opinion question relating to the fluoridation of all public water systems within Davis County be placed on the 
ballot at the next general election which will be held on Tuesday, November 7,2000. 
2. The specific question to be placed before the voters is as follows: 
COMMISSIONERS' MINUTES - DAVIS COUNTY 0462 
ualizations 
proved 
< Refunds 
Droved 
Should fluorine be added to the public water supplies within Davis County? 
UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED this 26th day of July, 2000, with Commissioners Dannie R. 
McConkie, Carol R. Page, and Gayle A. Stevenson all voting "aye." 
DAVIS COUNTY 
Bv /s/ Dannie R. McConkie 
ATTEST: 
/$/Steve S, Rawlings 
Dannie R. McConkie, Chairman 
Board of County Commissioners 
Steve S. Rawlings 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
The Commission feels the November election is a fair public forum to decide whedier fluoride should be 
placed in the water. A motion was made by commissioner Stevenson to adopt the resolution as presented and 
read. This motion unanimously carried as each voted "aye" to the second from Commissioner Page. 
Upon recommendation of Carol Buckley, Davis County Assessor, tax equalizations were approved 
for Paul and Rhonda Hill (14-166-0017) and Carlos and Irene Salazar (12-265-0048) with a motion from 
Commissioner Page. After a second to the motion was given by Commissioner Stevenson, this motion 
carried. 
Upon recommendation of Carol Buckley, Davis County Assessor, tax refunds were approved for the 
following with a motion from Commissioner Stevenson: 
Bountiful 
Kaysville 
BalaCnydwdy,PA 
Woodbridge, NJ 
Brigham City, Utah 
Fruit Heights 
Portland, Oregon 
Bedford, Texas 
Lakeview Animal Clinic 
Jones-Edward D. Jones & Company 
American Business Leasing Inc. 
Bellsouth Wireless Data LP 
Big West Oil Company 
Brad Stone Golf Inc. 
HLC Financial Inc. (2) 
Qualex Inc. #1755 
Pizza Hut #201017 Louisville, Kentucky 
Second to the motion was made by Commissioner Page and after a unanimous "aye" vote, this motion 
carried. 
Meeting adjojimed. 
dl—f\an. 
Clerk 
COMMISSION MINUTES 
31 July 2000 
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis County 
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on July 31,2000. Members present were Commissioner Carol R. Page, 
Commissioner Gayle A. Stevenson, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Deputy County Attorney Gerald E. 
1 Hess and Deputy Clerk Nancy Bumingham. Commissioner Dannie R. McConkie was excused 
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PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
I EXHIBIT NO. 
COMMISSION MINUTES 
28 August 2000 
s l 
CASEN0.^a^l3( / j 
DATEREC'D 
I IN EVIDENCE 
CLERK \3tS 
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis County 
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on August 28,2000. Members present were Chairman Dannie R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, Commissioner Gayle A. Stevenson, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Deputy 
County Attorney Gerald E. Hess and Deputy Clerk Nancy Burningham. 
m's Acres 
bdivision 
>proved 
Barry Burton, Davis County Community and Economic Development 
requested approval of the Ann's Acres Subdivision final plat. The subdivision is located in the Hooper area 
at 5500 West and 2425 North. One large parcel is being divided into two lots. A portion of the property will 
be dedicated to the road which is already in existence. Pipe will be installed along the road frontage of 228 
feet where an open ditch exists and where a driveway will be constructed. A variance will be granted as the 
open ditch on the 191 foot side of the lot will not be piped at this time. The standard lien agreement related 
to installation of curb, gutter and sidewalks will be required. The Davis County Planning Commission has 
approved the final plat request and recommends approval of such. Commissioner Stevenson made a motion 
for final approval of the Ann's Acres Subdivision final plat widi the conditions outlined. Commissioner Page 
seconded this motion, each voted "aye", motion carried. 
isolution 
2000-213 
> Place 1/4 
ant Sales 
ix For 
*ans. Issue 
n Nov. 
action Bal-
t Adopted 
A Resolution #2000-213 to place on the November election ballot a proposal to impose a one-
quarter cent sales and use tax was presented for consideration and adoption and reads as follows: 
#2000-213 
RESOLUTION 
A RESOLUTION TO PLACE ON THE BALLOT A 
PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE A ONE-QUARTR CENT 
SALES AND USE TAX ON ALL SALES AND USES 
WITHIN DAVIS COUNTY AS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 
WHEREAS, Section 59-12-502 of the Utah Code allows Davis County to impose a sales and use 
tax of lA of 1% on all sales and uses widiin Davis County as authorized by law to fund a "fixed guideway and 
expanded public transportation system"; and 
WHEREAS, Davis County may impose the tax referreed to in this Resolution only if the Davis 
County Commission submits by resolution the proposal to all qualified voters widiin die County for approval 
at a general or special election conducted i nthe manner provided by law; and 
WHEREAS, die Davis County Commission is in need of additional revenue to fund a fixed guideway 
and expanded public transportation system within Davis County. 
BE IT RESOLVED by die Board of County Commissioners of Davis County that the following 
proposal be submitted to all qualified voters within Davis County for approval at die general election to be 
held on November 7,2000: 
Be it resolved diat die Davis County Commission shall impose a sales and use tax of one-
fourth cent per dollar effective January 1,2001, on all sales and uses widiin Davis County as 
audiorized by law for die purpose of implementing a long range regional transportation 
improvement plan and system, which includes funding a fixed guideway (computer or light 
rail system) and expanded public transportation system (increased frequency and coverage 
of bus service including evenings, holidays and Sundays). 
Be it further resolved that if the majority of voters voting in the general election approve the 
foregoing proposal it shall become effective on the first day of January 2001. 
UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED this 28th day of August, 2000, with Commissioners Dannie R. 
McConkie, Carol R. Page and Gayle A. Stevenson all voting "aye." 
DAVIS COUNTY 
By Isf Dannie R. McConkie 
Dannie R McConkie, Chairman 
Board of County Commissioners 
ATTEST: 
M .Steve S. Rawlines 
Steve S. Rawlings 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
Kathryn Pett of the Utah Transit Authority suggested a change in the original wording of the resolution to 
clarify that the funds would be used for a long range regional transportation improvement plan with funds 
collected in Davis County to be used in Davis County. Mike Allegra of the Utah Transit Authority indicated 
that UTA reports annually revenues and where the funds are spent. Davis County Attorney Gerald Hess 
stated that the language of die resolution to be adopted needed to be close to State Statute requirements in the 
event the issue is challenged. After some discussion regarding the clarity of die resolution language for the 
public to understand that the funds would be used in Davis County to enhance public transit to connect with 
Weber and Salt Lake Counties, die foregoing resolution was adopted. A motion was made by Commissioner 
Page to place the sales tax resolution on die November ballot as modified. This motion carried after a 
unanimous "aye" vote to the second from Commissioner Stevenson. Stewart Adams of the Transportation 
Task Force and Fruit Heights Mayor Richard Harvey spoke in favor of the resolution. 
Fawn Jensen, Davis County Clerk/Auditor Department 
presented the following property tax equalization requests for approval by the Board of Equalization as 
recommended by the County Assessor: 
01-225-0157 Paul & Judith Turner 
02-164-0081 Jack Ricks 
03-039-0038 Richard & Kris Brierley 
05-047-0071 Bret & Amy Johnson 
05-053-0079 Toni May Hoffman 
09-090-0023 Grant & Barbara Major 
09-159-0143 Scott McNair 
11-047-0704 Dean & Gwen Pierce 
11-123-0004 Donald Nay 
12-238-1214 John &Mei Lin young 
01-197-0016 Robert Vickerman 
03-035-0026 Osterloh Investment Co. 
03-178-0005 Joseph & Georgine Steenblik 
04-087-0106 Tommy & Marsha Baker 
04-123-0018 John & Shawna May 
05-086-0031 Konrad & Erika Klotz 
07-042-0025 Charles Edwards 
07-075-0418 Kimberlee Home 
08-104-0138 Michael Greenhalgh 
09-020-0008,09-020-0009 Dale Lorbeske 
09-265-0005 Burrell Davis 
11-416-0207 Cory Holm 
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Fluoridation of Davis County Culinary Water Supply 
Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis 
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PRELIMINARY INFORMATION 
Cost of proposed measure # 2: 
Some cities have indicated they anticipate recovering costs by connection 
through increasing base rates. Following are the estimated increases for those 
cities reporting: 
Connection Fee Base Rate 
City Annual Increase %Increase 
Centerville $31 22% 
North Salt Lake $31 17% 
Woods Cross $18 19% 
Bountiful $12 20% 
The Davis Health Board reports that fluoridation of the public culinary water 
systems in Davis County will produce an average cost per person per year of 
approximately $2. The Health Department has also reported that Fruit Heights 
will have an estimated connection charge of $3.80 equating to a per person per 
year cost of under $1. 
Costs referred to above have been included in this pamphlet as submitted and 
have not been audited or otherwise verified by the Davis County 
CIerk/Auditor\s Department. 
If you wish further information on specific costs in your area contact your city 
or water district office. 
Arguments against and for measure # 2: 
The arguments against and for Davis County Ballot Measure # 2 are the 
opinions of the authors and have been printed as submitted. They have been 
placed in this information pamphlet in the order determined by a random 
selection assisted by members of the Health Board and the Health Department. 
Public Review 
A complete copy of the fluoride resolution and measure is available at the 
Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah. 
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ARGUMENT AGAINST FLUORIDATION 
There are different kinds of fluoride. The kind of fluoride used in 90% of the 
fluoridation systems 
•is NOT the naturally-occurring calcium fluoride already present in water. 
•is NOT pharmaceutical grade fluoride that's in over-the-counter products or 
prescription tablets/drops. 
•is NOT biodegradable. 
•IS a cumulative poison. 
•IS more toxic than lead. 
•CANNOT legally be dumped into the ocean. 
Many scientists oppose fluoridation. "As the professionals who are 
charged with assessing the safety of drinking water, we conclude that the 
health and welfare of the public is not sewed by the addition of this substance 
to the public water supply/ (EPA union scientists/professionals) Twelve Nobel 
Prize winners in chemistry and biology oppose fluoridation. Most 
endorsements for fluoridation by trade associations are based on outdated 
information, not current research/data. 
Health risks. "Subsets of the population may be unusually susceptible to the 
toxic effects of fluoride...[including] the elderly, people with [nutritional] 
deficiencies...and people with cardiovascular and kidney problems.11 (U.S. 
Health and Human Services) Children from low-income families are at 
particular risk because of nutritional deficiencies. 
Congressional investigation. The FDA, CDC, and EPA have NO studies 
showing safety or effectiveness of the kinds of fluoride actually usedto 
fluoridate water. (Congressional subcommittee, June, 2000) The investigation 
is continuing. 
Fluoride ON the teeth, not IN the body, fights tooth decay best. 
"Fluoride...works primarily via topical mechanisms." (Cover story, Journal 
of the American Dental Association, July, 2000) "...regular exposure to 
fluoride (toothpastes/rinses) [is] superior to fluoridated water for [cavity] 
prevention." (Pediatric Nursing; 23(2):155-159,1997) 
Recommended Dally Fluoride Supplementation (American Dental 
Association): 
•Pregnant women, none 
•Infants to six months, none 
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Overdosing Is Inevitable. It is impossible to control the amount of water 
people drink; therefore, it is impossible to control how much fluoride adults, 
children, and infants consume. Also, many beverages, baby foods, cereals, 
and juices, processed with fluoridated water, contain unsafe levels of fluoride 
far above the amount suggested for our water. Dental fluorosis 
(mottling/discoloration of teeth) ife one result of too much fluoride. 
FDA does not classify fluoride as an essential nutrient. There is no such 
thing as a fluoride deficiency disease. 
Fluoridation may Increase property taxes. Water districts can cover their 
costs for fluoridation through water bills and/or increased property taxes. A full 
disclosure of ALL costs has NOT been made. 
Fluoride's already available for children who need It. Free fluoride rinses 
are available in public schools. Utah's Children's Health Insurance Plan 
(CHIP) covers dental care for children in low/middleHncome households. 
Mass-medication. It's not appropriate to use the public water supply as a 
delivery system for medication. There's a difference between treating water 
with chlorine to make it safe and treating people with a drug or medication. 
FDA classifies fluoride as an unapproved drug. 
Medication without consent. It's morally wrong to force people to take a 
medication without their consent or against their will. Should we force 
fluoridation on our neighbors, especially when new research shows that we 
don't have to drink fluoride to get the best effect from it? 
Vote NO on FLUORIDATION! 
www.StopFluoridation.homestead.com 
Gene W. Miller, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus; former head—Department of 
Biology, Utah State Univ. 
Marc D. Flack, D.D.S., F.A.G.D., F.IAO.M.T. 
Paul Barney, MD 
David A. Hansen, Citizens for Safe Drinking Water—Utah, Davis County 
Howard C. Nielson, Utah State Senator, Former U.S. Congressman 
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ARGUMENT FOR FLUORIDATION 
Recently, Surgeon General David Satcher stated: "Community water 
fluoridation remains one of the great achievements of public health in the 
twentieth century!" Why? Because it is a safe and inexpensive means of 
improving dental health for everyone. Thousands of U.S. communities are 
fluoridating their water today, with the first one beginning in 1945. Despite 
fluoridation's impressive record, Davis County has not taken advantage of this 
remarkable public health measure. Our votes this year can make a difference 
in oral health for us and for succeeding generations. Please consider the 
following: 
What About Fluoride? Fluoride is a naturally occurring trace element found in 
all water. It is important for the development of healthy bones and teeth. The 
Institute of Medicine (1997) classified fluoride as a micronutrient, citing it, along 
with calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, and vitamin D, as an "important 
constituent in maintaining health," 
What Is Water Fluoridation? Water fluoridation is the adjustment of the 
natural fluoride content of water to one part per million (1ppm)--a level of 
intake that strengthens tooth enamel and sharply reduces dental decay. 
Does Fluoridation Work? Yes! Fluoridation can prevent as much as 40-60% 
of decay in children and adults. It works better than other forms of fluoride 
because it is less expensive, more reliable, and does not require a conscious 
action to use it. 
Is Fluoridation Safe? Absolutely! Although a few, very vocal critics oppose 
fluoridation, the science and medical communities are solidly behind it. There 
have been literally thousands of scientific studies done to examine the 
effectiveness and safety of fluoride. Each new study has reaffirmed its medical 
safety and its effectiveness in preventing dental disease. This is why credible 
scientific, dental, medical and public health organizations everywhere support 
water fluoridation. It is why Hill Air Force Base implemented fluoridation 
several years ago. And, it is why over 270 Davis County doctors and dentists 
have endorsed water fluoridation and are recommending it to their patients. 
Is Fluoridation Expensive? Water fluoridation is a bargain. Average national 
yearly costs vary from 31 c - $2.12 per person (U.S. Public Health Service). 
Carefully estimated, average, county-wide costs in Davis County are expected 
to be about $2 per person per year. Fluoridation is much less expensive than 
treating tooth decay. For every $1 spent on fluoridation, up to $80 is saved in 
dental treatment costs. 
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Does Water Fluoridation Violate Personal Rights? Fluoridation is viewed by 
the courts as a proper means of furthering public health and welfare. The 
federal appellate courts have ruled 13 times that water fluoridation does hot 
violate personal or religious constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments. The Utah Legislature views fluoridation as a proper 
issue for the majority of voters to determine. Voters in Brigham City and Helper 
chose fluoridation in the 1960s. 
Fluoridation has a 50 year track record of safety and effectiveness. More than 
70% of the U.S. population enjoys its benefits. It's time for us to do the same. 
Please vote YES on water fluoridation. 
Beth Q. Beck, EdD, Chairperson, Davis County Board of Health 
Edward B. Clark, MD, Medical Director, Primary Children's Medical Center 
Brian D. Rigby, DMD, South Davis Dental Society President, Utah 
Dental Association 
J. Leon Sorenson, Executive Vice President, Utah Medical Association 
Tammy Anderson, Region III Director, Utah Parent Teacher Association 
7 
Steve S. Rawlings 
)avis County Clerk/Auditor 
P.O. Box 618 
^armington, UT 84025 
PRESORTED 
STANDARD 
VS. POSTAGE PAID 
FARMINGTON. UT 
PERMIT NO. I 
Tab 8 
AVERAGE COST PER PERSON IN 2002 OF DAVIS COUNTY 
1/4 CENT TRANSIT SALES TAX APPROVED IN 2000 ELECTION 
1. The 1/4 cent additional transit sales tax passed in 2000 produced revenue in the 
amount of $6,665,986.50 for the first full year of collection in 2002. 
2. Divided by a Davis County population of 250,000 for 2001, the cost per person of that 
additional 1/4 cent is $26.66. 
PLAINTIFF§,EXHIBIT 
[EXW8ITN0. 
DATEREC'D 
M EVIDENCE 
m&Fr 
2 
Tab 9 
May 7.2001 
David A Hansen 
380 Oak Lane 
Kaysvaie, UT 84037 
(801)544-2744 
Sieve Rawhngs 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
P.O. Box 618 
Farraington, UT 84025-0618 
Dear Mr. Rawlings* 
Please accept the attached initiative petition as the first phase of the petition process. We, the 
undersigned, want a re-vote on the issue of water fluoridation for Davis County placed on the 
November 2002 ballot. 
The Initiative Description is as follows; 
"Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" 
Also, we respectfully demand that we be allowed to select the wording of the question as it will 
appear on the ballot I will contact you and Davis County Civil Attorney Gerald Hess once the 
petition is filed to work out the details of the wording of the ballot question. 
Filially we respectfully demand that your office begin to process the paper work so that we may 
begin to collect the required signatures as soon as possible. If you have any further questions, 
please feel free to contact me at (801)544-2744 (evenings) or (801)594-3857 (daytime). 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
David A. Hansen 
32« 
^UlNIIFPSExST 
IKHIBITHO. _/C 
I W EVIDENCE. 
[CLERK 
MAY 0 8 2001 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR 
enc: Initiative Description and Sponsor Signatures 
Wet* 
We, the undersigned, propose the following question be placed on the 2002 General Election 
ballot in Davis County: 
Initiative Description: The opportunity to re-vote ou the addition of fluoride to the 
Davis County public water supplies 
WE, THE UKDERSIGNED, WANT THE ISSUE OF WATER FLUORIDATION FOR DAVIS 
COUNTY PLACED ON THE NOVEMBER 2002 BALLOT. 
Sponsor Statement 
I, David A. Hansen, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within 
the last three years. x—\ , 
David A- Hansen \ y / ^ / V 
380 Oak Lane Sponsor's Signature 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801)544-2744 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this O 
A.D. 2001 
Notary Public ' 
-a _ day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Nancy L Stevanton 
28 6ast$taloSL 
Farmlngton, Utan 9402S 
My Commission 6*pira* 
January 3. Z0<U 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor Statement 
t Curtis Oda, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last 
three years. 
Curtis 0<Ja 
$70 S. State 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
(801)773-9796 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this f^L day of jQjd^. 
• AJD. 2001 
Sponsor's Signature 
^?1« '7 Iff J^ ,^JZJ&£ 
Notary Publii t yLa*/th*-^' 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~~ 
Nancy L Stev«nton 
21 East Statu St. 
FarmtaQton.Utafi u o z s 
My Cammisaitn Exjrfft* 
January 3,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
75" 
Sponsor Statement 
I, James R. Knowies, affirm I am a regisiered^votenind I have vpi^ d inajcfip 
the last rhree ye&xs s'T*? %.<" _ J ^ ' / / ' / '-—A 
James FL Knowies ^ j j z ^ ^ 
458 S. 230 W. / / ^ ^ p o n s o r T S i g n a t u r e 
KaysviHc. UT 84Q37 \y 
(801)547*5084 
lar general election in Utah wiihin 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this
 t 
A.D. 2001 
Noiarv Public 
<Tt> >yof72ZiUi NOTARY PUBLIC ] 
Nancy L Stevenson 
2fl East State SI. 
Farmington.Utah 84025 
My Commission Expires 
January 3.2004 
STATE OF fJTAH 
Sponsor Statement 
I, Helen J. Watts, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the 
last three yeara. 
Helen J. Wato 
2589 E. 2750 N. 
Laytoa UT 84040 
(801)771-2621 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this
 g 
A.D. 2001 
ton "AW -
Notaiy Public J> 
Spon$o£6 Signature 
^ S , day of fugy 
-*S£§>S NOTARY PUBLIC 
^ S S u r ^ V U N D A M A Y fs( SSreHct Yet 2 e Ea*f Sta*« $*"* 
'51 mt&m 12} Fm™*9r°n. Utah 84025 v
 toy Uommisjioft Expires 
Gcwoer 5, ?,002 
STATE OF OTAfl 
Sponsor Statement 
I, David W. Monson, iffirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within 
the last three yeais. 
David W. Monson 
137 S. 400 E, 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
(801)773-2435 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this 
AJD. 2001 
/Sponsor's Signature/ 
7 j ~ _ _ - day of/zhzfa 
"NOTARY PUBLIC 
SNL Nancy L. Steransan 
A
™ 25ea5tStawSt. 
INITIATIVE PETITION 
To the Honorable Sieve kawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor: 
Wc, the undersigned citizens of Davis County, Utah, respectfully request that the following proposed law, aRe-vote on Man 
Fluoridation AcV\ be submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to the I 
voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejects the proposed law or takes no action 01 
Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act 
Sectiou 1. Finding of the Voters: We the voters of Davis County find that: 
a. Evidence points io health risks to persons who ingest or use fluoride, its derivatives> or compounds; 
b. Full disclosure of these risks have not been made lo the citizens of Davis County; 
c. It is unconstitutional for one segment of Ihe population to impair another segment's freedom of choice by fluoridating 
public water supply. 
d. 1 rue county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent cost estimates are astronomical. 
Section 2. Rcquesi for re-vote on fluoridation. We the voters of Davis County respectfully demand that the question be re-submitle 
voters with the ballot reading as follows: "Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?" 
Section;3. Repeal of prior action: We the volers of Davis County request that if the voters return a NO answer to the ballot, the pub 
water supplies in Davis County shall not be fluoridated and that all fluoridation and/or proposed fluoridation of public water suppli< 
cease. 
Section 4. Infective date: This act shall lake e fleet five days following its passage by a vote of the legal voters of Davis County. 
Section 5. Severability Clause: If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is h 
invalid, the lcmainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Each signer of this petition states: 
i have personally signed this petition; I am registered lo vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in Utah before the ceriii 
of the petition names by the county clerk. 
Initiative Title: Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act (TCT)/>6* 
Wui'iiitftg: It is ci class A. nu&rtcurcaiior for anyone lo sign m) milinlive petition uttli any oilier iimac thaw liis own, or knowingly io sign Uis name more than OIKC for llw same mcciswc, or lo s 
initiative petition when he kuov-s t«c is uol a tegistered volcr oiid kno\vs _Jutf he does nol i.Uend lo become registered lo vote before the certification of the petition names by the county deck. 
Each signer says: "I have personally signed this petition; I am registered io vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in 11 ta 
the certification of the petition names by the county clerk; and my residence and i>ost office address are written correctly after my na 
l J •• " • 
Foromrcu^ouiy j Registered Voter's Printed Name 
R C
* i tXfus-be1c*kUioW«:©~.rd) 
I 
t 
i 
I j I 1 
! 
I 
| 
J 
1 
[ 
j 
I : i : 
Signature of Registered Voter 
,., ._ —_____ ._____ _____ .... . 
J 
1 Street Address, City, State, Zip Co 
"VERIFICATION 
State of Utah, County of Davis 
I. of 
hereby state that: I am registered to vote in Utah, 
"All the names that appear on this sheet were signed by persons who professed to be the persons whose names appear in it, and each of them 
his name on it in my presence; 
I believe that each has printed and signed his name and written his post office address and residence correctly, and that each signer is registe 
vole in Utah or imends to become registered to vote before the certification of the petition names by the county clerk,1* 
Signature of Witness 
Address of Witness 
Phone Number 
Tab 10 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
Steve S, Rawlings, CGFM 
Clerk/Auditor 
Patricia Beckstead 
Elections Coordinator 
801-451-3589 
CERTIFICATION 
INITIATIVE PETITION 
Rlv VOTE < )N MANDATORY FLUORIDATION ACT 
I, Steve S. Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor of Davis County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that 8,663 signatures are required to submit the attached Initiative Petition for 
"Re-Vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" to the Davis County Commission. A11 
signature packets have been completed and 9,650 have been verified as registered voters. 
SUMMARY 
Packets received 
Signatures Filed 
Registered 
Not Registered 
Duplicate Signatures 
Illegible 
Disqualified 
Dated this 9^_ day of July 2002. 
207 
12,146 
9,650 
1,478 
847 
36 
135 
r\ 
d^ve4 
(SEAL) 
Rawlings 
Davis County Clerk/Audito; 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 1 
EXHIBIT NO. / « ? -
DATEREC'D 
IN EVIDENCE 
CLERK / S 
pgOTfU 
MAY 0 8 2001 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR 
Steve Rawlings 
Davis County Clerk/Auditor 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025-0618 
Dear Mr. Rawlings: 
Please accept the attached initiative petition as the first phase of the petition process. We, the 
undersigned, want a re-vote on the issue of water fluoridation for Davis County placed on the 
November 2002 ballot 
The Initiative Description is as follows: 
"Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" 
Also, we respectfully demand that we be allowed to select the wording of the question as it will 
appear on the ballot. I will contact you and Davis County Civil Attorney Gerald Hess once the 
petition is filed to work out the details of the wording of the ballot question. 
Finally we respectfully demand that your office begin to process the paper work so that we may 
begin to collect the required signatures as soon as possible. If you have any further questions, 
please feel free to contact me at (801)544-2744 (evenings) or (801)594-3857 (daytime). 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sjncexely, 
David A. Hansen 
May 7,2001 
David A. Hansen 
380 Oak Lane 
Kaysville,UT 84037 
(801)544-2744 
enc: Initiative Description and Sponsor Signatures 
We, i .idersigned, propost Hit following qi n be placed on the 2002 General Etev 
ballot in Davis County: 
Initiative Description: The opportunity to re-vote on the addition of fluoride to the 
Davis County public water supplies 
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, WANT THE ISSUE OF WATER FIIJORIDATION FOR DAVIS 
COUNTY PLACED ON THE NOVEMBER 2002 BALLOT. 
Sponsor Statement 
I, David A. Hansen, affii in 1 am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within 
the last three years, ^ — \ 
David A. Hansen 
380 Oak Lane 
Kaysville,UT 84037 
(801)544-2744 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this Q_ 
AJD. 2001 
Sponsor's Signature 
day «8L V-
Publ& N01 
n'^Tj^MS-U^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Nancy L. Stevenson 
28 East State St. 
Farmlngton.Utah 84025 
My Commission Expires 
January 3.2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor Statement 
I, Curtis Oda, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last 
three years. s 
Curtis Oda 
970 S. State 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
(801)773-9796 
Sponsor's Signature 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this 7 ^ day of/9/feU/-. 
AD. 2001 V. 
•tary Publi^ Nol 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Nancy L. Stevenson 
21 East State St. 
Farmington.Utah §4025 
My Ctmmissitn Exerts 
January 3,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponso .^cement 
I, James R. Knowles, affirm I am a registered voterjmd I have ^ 
the last three years. 
James R. Knowles 
458 S. 230 W. 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801)547-5084 
$L Subscribed and affirmed before me this. 
A.D. 2001 
'<*<JJJ£KA • sQ$U*A4<vi<L+-v(_J 
day of t/JlA^L 
Putfic 
;ular general election in Utah within 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Nancy L. Stevenson 
28 East State St. 
Farmington.Utah 84025 
My Commission Expires 
January 3,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor Statement 
I, Helen J. Watts, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the 
last three years. 
Helen J. Watts 
2589 E. 2750 N. 
Layton UT 84040 
(801)771-2621 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this 
A.D. 2001 
ton -AW 
Notary Public ^ 
/Liu, Q- Wirffr 
Sponsc£& Signature 
-\\ day of IUQV 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LINDA MAY 
28 East State Street 
Farminpton, Utah 84025 
toy Commission Expires 
Ociooer 5,2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor Statement 
I, David W. Monson, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within 
the last three years. 
David W. Monson 
137 S. 400 E. 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
(801)773-2435 
Subscribed and affirmed before me this 
AD 2001 
ytZ day of 
Notary PubHc 
^.<</3^^^<^X^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Nancy L. Stevenson 
28 East State St. 
Farmington.Utah 84025 
My Commission Expires 
January 3,2004 
<s2S* RTATr? OF UTAH 
INITIATIVE PETITION 
To the Honorable Steve Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor: 
Vf he undersigned citizens of Davis County, Utah, respectfully request that the following proposed law, "Re-vote on Mandatory 
?L jridation Acf\ be submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to the legal 
voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejects the proposed law or takes no action on it. 
Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation A ct 
Jectioe 1. Finding of the Voters: We the voters of Davis County find that: 
a. Evidence points to health risks to persons who ingest or use fluoride, its derivatives, or compounds; 
b Full disclosure of these risks have not been made to the citizens of Davis County; 
c It is unconstitutional for one segment of the population to impair another segment's freedom of choice by fluoridating the 
public water supply, 
d. True county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent cost estimates are astronomical 
j 2. Request for re-vote on fluoridation: We the voters of Davis County respectfully demand that the question be re-submitted to the 
oters with the ballot reading as follows: "Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?" 
ection 3. Repeal of prior action: We the voters of Davis County request that if the voters return a NO answer to the ballot, the public 
rater supplies in D&vis County shall not be fluoridated and that all fluoridation and/or proposed fluoridation of public water supplies shall 
sase. 
action 4, Effective date: This act shall take effect five days following its passage by a vote of the legal voters of Davis County. 
action 5. Severability Clause: If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held 
valid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
r
** signer of this petition states: 
lave personally signed this petition; I am registered to vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in Utah before the certification 
the petition names by the county clerk. 
UAVI5 Ul M m I Y —IIMIIIAI |vt- M H H -N REPORTING FORM 
N " IT; ii c-VOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDATION AC I Page 1 OT 5 
Packet # 
100 
101 
107 
108 
110 
111 
112 
1 16 
I20 
123 
127 
I29 
133 
134 
141 
143 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
153 
154 
155 
161 
165 
168 
171 
173 
174 
175 
184 
185 
.186 
190 
191 
192 
193 
104 
209 
211 
213 
Sig. Filed 
68 
69 
68 
55 
5 
18 
2 B 
1 0 
70 
49 
69 
71 
51 
59 
69 
16 
50 
65 
59 
21 
3 i 
33 
70 
70 
52 
45 
80 
6 1 
66 
69 
70 
34 
1 I 
68 
61 
68 
71 
64 
61 
47 
5 
57 
Registered 
56 
54 
60 
45 
5 
34 
28 
63 
49 
40 
45 
62 
51 
47 
59 
12 
35 
48 
46 
15 
27 
24 
57 
59 
43 
21 
54 
26 
35 
53 
52 
23 
61 
59 
43 
61 
59 
55 
55 
55 
45 
33 
5 
45 
Non-Reg 
9 
12 
1 
1 
0 
4 
0 
2 
14 
1 
20 
5 
2 
7 
5 
2 
9 
4 
4 
3 
4 
0 
6 
7 
6 
16 
3 
18 
20 
7 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
7 
6 
3 
8 
0 
7 
Diff. Add. 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
2 
0 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
5 
1 
1 
4 
4 
5 
1 
2 
4 
2 
0 
1 
3 
4 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
0 
1 
0 
4 
4 
0 
1 
Illegible 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
i 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Duplicates 
0 
0 
5 
8 
0 
8 
0 
4 
1 
6 
2 
2 
3 
• 3 
0 
0 
3 
1 
5 
1 
1 
7 
0 
1 
3 
5 
0' 
5 
0 
7 
9 
,1 
1 
3 
9 
1 
5 
1 
5 
9 
8 
1 
0 
4 
Diff. Co 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Disqualified 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
8 
0 
3 
1 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
0 
8 
4 
II l 
1 ' 
2 
3 
C 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
219 53 3 i 
DAVIS COUNTY-INITIATiy-^PETITION REPORTING FORM 
[ II I riON TITLE: Kt-VOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDATION AC I Page 2 of 5 
Packet # Sig. Filed Registered Non-Reg Diff.Add, Illegible Duplicates Diff Co Disqualified 
222 
226 
228 
232 
234 
253 
254 
264 
282 
291 
292 
294 
295 
298 
299 
304 
305 
315 
320 
323 
324 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
334 
335 
339 
340 
341 
362 
367 
368 
380 
381 
383 
390 
392 
393 
404 
416 
418 
42ft 
67 
b9 
49 
66 
lii.fi. 
..11! 
Ml 
4 1 
Hii.11 
,10 
28 
42 
50 
70 
60 
50 
70 
54 
("•!«! 
'II 
69 
70 
70 
70 
713 
68 
68 
66 
88 
39 
47 
68 
68 
69 
70 
68 
44 
59 
70 
64 
59 
50 
46 
46 
52 
37 
42 
31 
44 
23 
23 
27 
35 
58 
39 
15 
65 
44 
45 
54 
59 
60 
64 
63 
56 
43 
62 
50 
41 
37 
54 
19 
36 
47 
45 
44 
64 
60 
38 
54 
47 
57 
6 
10 
2 
7 
5 
2 
0 
7 
11 
1 
1 
3 
1 
3 
6 
3 
2 
2 
3 
9 
5 
5 
5 
4 
8 
4 
2 
16 
18 
!.»1 
7 
2 
4 
8 
1 
14 
18 
1 
4 
2 
2 
8 
2 
0 
7 
1 
9 
7 
0 
5 
2 
2 
7 
0 
3 
7 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
2 
4 
0 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
0 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2 
1 
7 
2 
1 
? 
0 
4 
1 
9 
3 
4 
11 
4 
4 
I) 
! 
8 
4 
23 
0 
5 
6 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
4 
17 
3 
0 
3 
4 
1 
1,0 
2 
6 
1 
5 
3 
1 
0 
1 
2 
8 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0' 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
CI 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
10 
"1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
DAVIS COUNTY -INITIATE PETITION REPORTING FORM 
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Packet # Sig. Filed Registered Non-Reg Dill Add Illegible Duplicates Diff. Co. Disqualified 
430 
433 
436 
437 
439 
440 
446 
447 
454 
455 
456 
462 
487 
490 
491 
496 
499 
500 
501 
501A 
502 
503 
504 
506 
509 
513 
517 
519 
519A 
520 
520A 
521 
522 
522A 
524 
525 
526 
531 
»>33 
038 
040 
541 
542 
542A 
70 
47 
64 
33 
70 
60 
52 
U 
(j!f! 
70 
33 
72 
08 
ill 
70 
70 
70 
44 
Ml. 
tt'1 
68 
40 
48 
71 
?!i 
I'l 
53 
70 
70 
70 
4; 
111! 
68 
69 
89 
71 
44 
70 
67 
70 
70 
52 
30 
42 
15 
53 
hi 
34 
m 
W 
SO 
58 
27 
9» 
On' 
04 
\ i 
66 
48 
34 
1/ 
44 
Ml 
fj2 
36 
29 
OH 
ill 
fi 
411 
57 
64 
4," 
10 
3a 
55 
57 
()*"! 
30 
4 J 
b2 
03 
45 
7 
1 
b 
4 
t 
4 
"1 
i 
11 
0 
LI 
6 
3 
i 
i 
m 
11 
0 
j 
i 
10 
i 
4 
2 
U 
1 
3 
8 
2 
1 i 
1 
19 
24 
10 
4 
(. 
4 
1 I 
4 
11 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
6 
1 
5 
4 
2 
4 
3 
4 
3 
2 
6 
0 
2 
2 
4 
0 
0 
1 
3 
2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
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COMMISSION MINUTES 
July 9,2002 
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis 
County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on July 9,2002. Members present were Commissioner Dannie R. 
McConkie, Commissioner Michael J. Cragun, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Chief Deputy Civil 
Attorney Gerald E. Hess, and Commission Office Manager Linda May. Commissioner Carol R. Page was 
excused as she is attending a conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico. 
Public Hear-
ing 
Commissioner Cragun made a motion to go into a public hearing. The motion was seconded by 
Commissioner McConkie. All voted aye. 
Rezone of 
One Parcel 
A-5toA-l 
for Earl 
Payne 
Barry Burton, Community and Economic Development, introduced Earl Payne. The purpose of 
the public hearing is to address a rezone of one parcel from A-5 to A-l as requested by Mr. Payne. The 
address is 1146 So. 4500 W in Syracuse. The land is boarded currently on two sides by A-l parcels. The 
sewer system* and utilities for services are in place. There were no public comments made. 
Commissioner Cragun made a motion to close the public meeting. Commissioner McConkie 
seconded the motion. All voted aye. 
approval of 
Rezone for 
:arl Payne 
\greement 
^2002-145 
lorgan As-
halt for 
ub. Works 
arkmg Lot 
zreement 
2002>I46 
ache Valley j 
ectnc for 
•affic Con-
}l Loops 
jrtification 
Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve the rezone of one parcel from A-5 to A-l as 
explained at the public hearing. Commissioner McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye. 
Dave Adamson, Davis County Public Works Director, presented an agreement #2002-145 with 
Morgan Asphalt, Inc. It is to construct a parking lot adjacent to the new Public Works Office Building. It 
is in the amount of $58,600.00. Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve. Commissioner 
McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye. The document is on file in the office of the Davis County 
Clerk/Auditor. 
Dave Adamson also presented an agreement #2002-146 with Cache Valley Electric. It is to install 
a video detection camera and traffic control loops to control the traffic light at 300 North 1000 West in 
Clearfield, Utah. It is in the amount of $850.00 to install the video detection camera and $3,600.00 to 
install the three traffic control loops. Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve. Commissioner 
McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye. The document is on file in the office of the Davis County 
Clerk/Auditor. 
Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor, and Pat Beckstead, Election Coordinator, presented the 
Certification for the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act. The signatures required 
were 8,663. All signature packets have been completed and 9,650 signatures have been verified as 
registered voters. The recommendation of the Commission is to forward the information to the Davis 
County Attorney Office for review and preparation of legal opinion to be given to the Commission on or 
before the meeting of August 6,2002. 
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Davis Court. > Clerk/Auditor 
S. Rawlings. CGFM 
Cleric/Auditor 
TO: 
hkOM: 
DATE: 
RE: 
Jerry Hess 
Steve S. Rawlings ^ R _ 
'
 7002 
•io i'cuuon 
Alter our discussion yesterday and reviewing the letter you received from Mr. David 
Irvine and the press release initiated by Utahns for Better Dental Health written by Beth 
::
 k and David Irvine, I would respectfnllv re.nv >^t that you consider the following in 
•. .uJknng '/our op'':-' *-; 
Section 20A-1-40: of the Election Code related to controversies says "(1) Courts, and 
lion officers shall construe the provisions of Title 20At Election Code, liberally to 
nnt the intent of th is title." 
Case law already in place mandates that the clerk (election official) cannot refuse a 
petition 'that is filed .and must take such petition to the legislative body if the required 
signatures are obtained .and certified. 
:||3US petition filed does have 'the heading "Initiative Petition" and does ask for a re vote on 
an, existing law. Liberally interpreting the election code, the petition could be 
.constructively construed as having the intent of a "Referendum Petition" which requires 
'the same number of signatures as an initiative petition. If the intent is to revote on an 
r'Sosting law the petition has fulfilled, in content and body, the requirements of a 
Referendum Petition." 
tlsing Mr. Irvine's own words from his press release, "1 hey are required to seek a 
referendum before the act complained of takes effect." The act of adding fluoride to the 
public culinary water systems in Davis County requires that one part per million be added 
to the system. That law has not yet been enacted because the mandate to fluoridate has 
not yet been fulfilled and has, in fact, been extended by the Board of Health until October 
15, 2002. It could be legitimately argued that the date the act takes effect is the date that 
one part per million is actually added to the "entire" Davis County Water System as 
required by the vote. In addition, with the court ruling related to Woods Cross, an 
argument may be made that the law as enacted and voted upon will never be able to "take 
effect" because an. entire city within the County wil 1 not add any fluoride to the water. 
( & ) " • 
As you remember, voting precincts and water district boundaries in the County do not 
match and it was decided that the election must be a "countywide" election and the vote 
considered such. No one City could stand-alone. Fluoridation is not yet a part of the 
entire County's water systems and may never be enacted in the entire County as the vote 
originally required. 
Mr. Irvine erroneously states in his letter to you 'The petition was filed with the County 
Clerk just aTew weeks ago." The fact is that the petition was officially filed with my 
office,* according to definitions and requirements of the election code, on May 8,2001 
&d is"well in advance of any fluoride being added to the water and the law taking effect 
if,*in fact, the law can ever take effect in the entire County. This date is also within the 
35-day timeframe of the fluoride order being issued by the Health Department on April 5, 
2001, which may be considered the date the law went into effect 
Your initial opinion letter, which I requested prior to the 2000 election, on the feasibility 
of having a countywide vote on fluoridation cautioned that the fluoride legislation itself 
was flawed and that the legislature should be asked to define the term "functionally 
separate" prior to the County embarking into putting the question on the ballot. You also 
cautioned that there were some cities and or water districts that may be functionally 
separate. Your concerns have now come to fruition and the law has not and cannot be 
fully implemented as originally promised by the Health Board and voted upon. 
It should also be mentioned that the press release talks about Centerville and the two 
votes held there (second vote by petition) related to fluoride in a positive way but makes 
no mention of the Court case involving Woods Cross City. 
Thanks again, for your dedicated time and concern. 
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Pat Beckstead stated that the special session of the legislature has determined that the election 
canvass can occur 7 -14 days following an election. This will allow each county to determine the date 
they will hold their canvass within the 7 -14 day time frame. 
Commissioner Cragun made a motion to go into closed session to discuss pending litigation. 
Commissioner Page seconded the motion. All voted aye. 
No further action upon returning to open meeting. Meeting adjourned. 
COMMISSION MINUTES 
August 6,2002 
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis 
County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on August 6, 2002. Members present were Chairman Dannie R. 
McConkie, Commissioner Carol R. Page, Commissioner Michael J. Cragun, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. 
Rawlings, Chief Deputy Civil County Attorney Gerald E. Hess, and Commission Office Manager Linda 
May. 
The petition for consideration of the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act is 
before the commission. Commissioner McConkie stated that the merits of fluoride, either for or against, 
will not be debated today. The petition has been presented and the factual data regarding the petition has 
been reviewed by the Davis County Attorney Office. Commissioner McConkie asked for Jerry Hess, 
Davis County Civil Attorney, to present his findings. The issue of a referendum or initiative petition was 
reviewed according to definition and under the laws of the State of Utah. A referendum by definition is to 
challenge a law passed by a local legislative body and repeal the law. An initiative petition is a new law. 
It is governed by election law. The constitution provides for petition initiatives. The process followed has 
met the requirements of the law. Jerry Hess stated that the Commissioners can (1) adopt and refer the 
matter to the people, (2) adopt and not refer to the people, or (3) reject the matter. Commissioner 
McConkie stated that he feels neutrality is in the best interest of the Commission, otherwise, to adopt 
would be to set up challenge under Utah Code appearing to put an end to fluoridation or to reject would 
give appearance of endorsement to continue the fluoridation. There are 9650 people who have signed the 
petition for revote which required 8663. Commissioner McConkie called twice for a motion and none was 
given. There was no action taken on this matter by the Commissioners. The Initiative Petition is now sent 
to Steve Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor, for preparation of putting it on the ballot in November 
according to election law. Mr. Rawlings stated that his office will ask the attorney's office for the official 
wording and move forward to place it on the ballot. 
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David R. Irvine (1621) 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)328-1155 
Janet I. Jenson (4226) 
JENSON & STAVROS, LLC 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)363-4011 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:
- W > DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH 
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, 
Steve S. Rawlings, 
Defendant. 
Civil No.: 020801343 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES and COSTS 
I. THE COURT HAS EQUITY POWER TO AWARD PLAINTIFF 
ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. 
1. Normally, attorneys' fees are not awarded to the prevailing party absent a contractual 
agreement or a statutory basis for making such an award. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized a doctrine in equity for making an award of attorneys' fees where a governmental entity 
charged with the statutory responsibility of enforcing the law fails to do so and that burden fells to 
private citizens. This is the "private attorney general" doctrine set out at length by the Court in 
Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759,781-784 (Utah 1994). 
2. In the Stewart case, the Public Service Commission and all the state agencies charged 
by law with the responsibility to set, review, or challenge utility rates, including the Committee of 
Consumer Services and the Division of Public Utilities, entered into a stipulation with U.S. West in 
which they all agreed to an incentive rate plan which allowed U.S. West to set its own rates and to 
veto any rates the Commission might adopt with which U.S. West disagreed. The citizen-
ratepayers who brought suit believed that all of the State's utility regulatory agencies had violated 
the law and the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court agreed, finding that the stipulated 
incentive rate plan was unconstitutional and permitted U.S. West to set rates that resulted in an 
unlawfully high rate of return. 
3. Moreover, the Stewart court awarded the citizen-plaintiffs their attorneys' fees. 
Stewart directly applies to the facts of the instant case because of one key common element: the 
state entities charged by statute to protect the public interest and the state's ratepayers all sided 
with U.S. West - even the Committee of Consumer Services sided with U.S. West — leaving the 
ratepayers utterly without an advocate and without counsel. The ratepayers who believed the 
stipulation was unconstitutional were left to their own devices. They had to retain private counsel 
to represent them because the officials charged by statute to protect the public interest abandoned 
it, leaving the public's interest without a voice. 
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4. It is clear from the Stewart opinion that the Court's majority was incensed that all of 
the state's utility regulators had abdicated their statutory regulatory role and had become advocates 
for a rate-setting scheme proposed by a utility which was, the Court found, both unlawful and 
unconstitutional. Because the state's ratepayers had been left totally on their own, without the 
benefit of the State's lawyers whose statutory duty was to enforce the law in their behalf, the Court 
invoked the "private attorney general" doctrine in order to relieve the private citizen plaintiffs of 
the cost of the attorneys' fees they had incurred to advocate the public interest which the state 
wrongfully abdicated. 
5. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explains the equity power of courts: "[I]n the 
absence of a statutory or a contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award 
reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity." [Citing 
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973).] Discussing the Court's 
"inherent power," he states: 
Another appropriate circumstance for awarding fees is where a party prevails "as a 
'private attorney general' when the 'vindication of a strong or societally important public 
policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiff's 
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization [citing Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 
25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326,569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)]." 
6. As more fully set out below, the facts of the instant case are identical to those of 
Stewart. As in Stewart, it is appropriate, fair, and equitable for the Court to enter an order 
awarding plaintiff its attorneys' fees for advocating the public's interest. Moreover, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-33-10 allows the Court to "make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just." 
The costs incurred by plaintiff in this action are just and reasonable, and they are set out, along 
with plaintiff's attorneys' fees and time, in Exhibit 1, which is attached hereto. 
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II. AS IN STEWART, THE COUNTY COMMISSION AND THE CLERK 
KNOWINGLY ABDICATED THEIR DUTY TO UPHOLD AND DEFEND THE LAW, 
LEAVING THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST UNREPRESENTED. 
7. It is beyond question that a fundamental aspect of due process is to have governmental 
decisions made by neutral, disinterested officials who uphold and follow established law. In the 
2000 general election, the majority had voted to fluoridate the water in Davis County. All sides 
had been given an opportunity to be heard and to vote, and the vote for fluoridation having carried 
a majority, the Davis County Commissioners and the Davis County Clerk had a duty to implement 
and sustain the will of the majority and to uphold the law which was — after November 2000 - to 
implement fluoridation. 
8. The Davis County Commissioners and the Davis County Clerk completely abdicated 
their duty to uphold and defend the will of the majority and the law. At a public meeting of the 
Davis County Commission on August 6, 2002, Commissioners and the defendant Clerk refused to 
take any action on the "initiative petition" which ultimately became the subject of this lawsuit. By 
refusing to take any action whatsoever, the Commissioners and the Clerk utterly abdicated the 
authority "public officials" have under well developed Utah case law, when presented with a 
petition or referendum for filing, "to reject that petition if, in fact, it is legally insufficient or is 
directed to a matter that is not subject to an initiative or referendum." Taylor v. South Jordan City 
Recorder, 972 P.2d 423 (Utah 1998), citing Salt Lake on Track v. Salt Lake City, 939 P.2d 680 
(Utah 1997) [citations omitted]. See also, White v. Welling, 57 P.2d 703 (Utah 1936); Tobias v. 
South Jordan City Recorder, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah 1998). 
9. Indeed, in failing to even consider the legal sufficiency of the proposed "initiative," the 
county officials ignored a prior meeting with plaintiffs counsel and Beth Beck and a letter setting 
out multiple ways in which the "initiative" was legally infirm and requesting that the Commission 
declare the petition to be a referendum filed out of time. 
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10. Finally, when the plaintiffs counsel requested an opportunity to explain at the public 
hearing the Commission's duty under Utah law to determine the legal sufficiency of the petition 
and to reject it if it were found to be an untimely referendum, the Commission Chairman refused to 
let him speak. 
11. In refusing to determine the legal sufficiency of the "initiative petition" presented to 
them, and in turning a blind eye to its infirmities pointed out by plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel, the 
Commission and Clerk willfully abdicated their duty to uphold and defend the law and to give 
effect to the will of the majority. Rather, the Commission and the Clerk deliberately ignored any 
inquiry into whether the "initiative" was, in fact, a legal referendum which should not have been 
placed on the ballot. Leaping over this issue, the Commission instead engaged in a lengthy 
discussion of "local initiatives" under Utah Code Ann. 20A-7-501(3)(d) which provides that "[i]f 
a county legislative body rejects a proposed county ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on 
it, the county clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at the next general election." By 
taking no action with regard to the "initiative" — knowing their refusal to act would result in 
placing the vote on fluoridation back onto the general election ballot — the Commission and the 
Clerk negated the effect of the majority's previous vote and left the public interest with no 
representative and no advocate. Not only was the public interest left without representation, but 
the County Attorney, who was called upon to defend the Commission's and the Clerk's knowing 
abdication, was thereby dragooned into representing the petition sponsors — a small but very vocal 
minority who were angry that they had lost fair and square in the previous election vote. 
12. It would not have been necessary for the plaintiff to file this lawsuit had the 
Commission and the Clerk performed their clear duty under settled Utah case law to vet the legality 
of the "initiative." Because they utterly abdicated their duty to do so, they abandoned the 
representation of the public interest as expressed by the 52% majority of county voters, and they 
5 
forced the County Attorney to expend public funds to represent the minority who wished to 
overturn the established law. Without plaintiffs willingness to bring this lawsuit, the public would 
have had no representation at all, their previous vote would have been negated, and the significant 
public expenditure in furtherance of fluoridation would have been simply wasted. 
III. HERE, THE COUNTY OFFICIALS' ABDICATION OF THEIR DUTY 
TO UPHOLD THE LAW AND REPRESENT THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
WAS MORE EGREGIOUS THAN IN THE STEWART CASE 
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN AND THE CLERK 
HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND A PERSONAL STAKE 
THAT WAS NEVER DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC. 
13. In the Stewart case, there was no indication that, in agreeing to stipulated ratemaking, 
the governmental decisionmakers in the Public Service Commission or the state agencies involved 
were advancing any self-interest or acting out of personal bias. Here, that is not so. 
14. As plaintiff discovered by checking records at the County Clerk's office, both the 
County Clerk and the Davis County Commission Chairman had signed onto the petition to repeal 
fluoridation. Neither the Clerk nor the Commission ever disclosed this fact in any public forum. 
More importantly, they failed to disclose during the public meeting on August 6, 2002 that they 
themselves had signed onto the petition, and that they personally supported a re-vote and the repeal 
of fluoridation. Given Commission Chairman McConkie's failure to disclose that he was a petition 
signer, his statements at the meeting to the effect that "We don't want to give anyone cause to say 
we are for or against a re-vote," ring hypocritically hollow. 
15. Nevertheless, without disclosing their pro-"initiative" bias or the fact that they had 
personally signed onto the very petition then before them for their consideration, the Commission 
and Clerk rejected any attempt to determine whether the "initiative petition" was legal and valid, 
and by dramatically opting to take no action, positively ensured that it advanced to the general 
election ballot. By declining to act, they knowingly advanced their own personal cause, and by 
failing to determine that the "initiative petition" was, in fact, an illegal, out-of-time referendum, 
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they ensured that their personal political views would advance. They did so, most deliberately, at 
the expense of the majority of voters in Davis County who did not share their view and whose votes 
were thereby negated and whose voice was left without a spokesman. Were it not for plaintiff and 
plaintiff's counsel, the public's interest and viewpoint would have been altogether unrepresented. 
16. By permitting an illegal petition, which some of them had signed, to advance to the 
ballot, the County Commission and the County Clerk forced the County Attorney to defend them if 
they were sued. This resulted in the fiill weight of the County's lawyers and the County's financial 
and litigation resources to be placed behind the defeated minority who were the authors and signers 
of the petition. The public's interest was completely abandoned by the County, just as it had been 
in Stewart 
17. The County Clerk's and the Commission Chairman's failure to disclose that they were 
considering a petition which they themselves had signed (and that by advancing the "initiative" to 
the general election ballot without determining its legality they were also advancing their secret 
personal bias against fluoridation), demonstrates a lack of good faith that is astounding in public 
officials. Water fluoridation has been a policy formally adopted by the County's own Board of 
Health since 1998.l The voters of Davis County adopted it as the law in November, 2000. The 
Health Department issued a mandatory fluoridation order on April 5,2001, which was binding on 
all water systems and cities in the County, 2 and pursuant to which the County Health Department, 
the water system operators, and the County's constituent cities had undertaken great expense and 
implementation work. 
The Commission Chairman's personal bias and the Commission's displeasure with the pro-fluoridation 
position taken by the Board of Health is also demonstrated by the fact that immediately following the 2000 
general election, the Commission completely reorganized the Board of Health, even though a majority of 
the County's voters approved of fluoridation. Only one of the nine members of the Board of Health was 
re-appointed by the Commission, and since that reorganization, the Board has had little since to say about 
fluoridation, one way or the other. 
2
 The only city not so bound is Woods Cross, per a previous order of this Court. 
7 
18. By refusing to determine the legality of the "initiative petition'' to repeal fluoride -
and by advancing to the ballot the "initiative' which the Clerk and the Commission Chairman had 
signed but failed to disclose - the Commission and the Clerk placed themselves and the services of 
the County Attorney squarely on the side of the defeated minority. The 52% majority, therefor, 
had no representation unless they could retain private counsel as in the Stewart case. This plaintiff 
found itself the sole advocate for the existing fluoridation law of Davis County, which, rightfully, 
should have been upheld and defended by the County Clerk, the County Commission, and the 
County Attorney. If the plaintiff had not retained private counsel willing to do the research and 
present the case in the short time prior to the ballots being printed, the will of the majority and the 
public interest would have been utterly without voice. 
IV, THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE CONFERRED A SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT ON 
THE TAXPAYERS OF DAVIS COUNTY BY VINDICATING THE 
RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY WHO VOTED FOR FLUORIDATION 
IN THE 2000 GENERAL ELECTION. 
19. This plaintiff has conferred a significant benefit on the majority of County voters in 
2000, who mandated that water systems be fluoridated, by giving their vote a voice and legally 
binding effect which the Commission and Clerk cynically had sought to nullify. Not one county 
officer charged with enforcing or defending the law of the County would stand with the plaintiff in 
the law's defense. The burden of defending the will of the majority, which should by every 
reasonable process have been taken up by the County Attorney, was ignored and abandoned by the 
County Attorney's primary clients. It is reasonable, equitable, and just, that the plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees - incurred in the defense of the legislative act of the majority of voters - be paid by 
the County, which should have been on the majority's side from the beginning. If plaintiffs fees 
are not awarded, then this action will have produced the odd result that the majority taxpayers 
whose interests were vindicated by the litigation will have subsidized all of the legal fees incurred 
in the attempt of the losing minority to nullify the 2000 majority vote. 
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20. The Stewart Court felt so strongly about officials' abdication of responsibility to act 
in the public interest as required by statute, which this case so closely parallels, that it ordered that 
the plaintiffs' fees be paid by U.S. West. The Court's holding is directly applicable to the facts of 
the fluoridation case: 
[P]laintiffs have successfully vindicated an important public policy benefiting all of the 
ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs, a handful of ratepayers, acting entirely on their own, 
took on [U.S.West], the Public Service Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities 
and have succeeded in having the Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful, 
section 54-4-4.1(2) declared unconstitutional, and the Commission's 'incentive' plan held 
invalid. It is significant that the Committee of Consumer Services, which by statute is 
charged with the responsibility of representing consumer interests, made no 
appearance at all on this appeal and that the Commission and the Division of Public 
Utilities have opposed the ratepayers on all issues. The results achieved by the ratepayers 
will necessarily benefit all [U.S. West] ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to 
future rates, irrespective of whether a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be 
ordered. Here, [U.S. West] has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and 
was authorized by the Commission's 'incentive regulation' order to retain revenues in 
excess of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs' action, all that would have been 
unchallenged, and none of [U.S. West's] ratepayers would ever have had any relief. In the 
absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the 
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees. 
Id. at 783-84, emphasis added. 
21. Here, but for the timely intervention of this plaintiff, the actions of the Commission 
and the Clerk to place a flawed and legally insufficient petition on the ballot would have gone 
unchallenged. The mooting of the Utah Constitution and referendum statute by the Commission 
and the Clerk would have gone unchallenged. Plaintiff is deserving of a fee award because it 
successfully vindicated a policy of broad public significance and importance: the decision of the 
52% majority in the 2000 election was held to be a binding legislative act, and the officers of the 
County were prevented from subverting it. That vote, which the County officers sought to ignore, 
was sustained as the law of the County. The case established a critical precedent for the future by 
reminding these County officers that the State referendum statute may not be arbitrarily subverted 
to serve the private interests of those elected to office and charged with the law's enforcement. 
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DATED this 7th day of November, 2002. 
David R. Irvine 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Award of 
Attorneys' Fees to be mailed this 7th day of November, 2002, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
Gerald Hess, Esq. 
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84025 
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Tab 15 
David R. Irvine (1621) 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 328-1155 
Janet I. Jenson (4226) 
JENSON & STAVROS, LLC 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 363-4011 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH -
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, 
Steve S. Rawlings, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID R. IRVINE, JANET L JENSON 
and ANDREW W. STAVROS 
Civil No.: 020801343 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DAVID R. IRVINE, JANET I. JENSON, and ANDREW W. STAVROS, being first duly 
sworn, depose and state as follows: 
Mr. Irvine: 
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since 1971. I am admitted to 
practice before all Utah state and federal courts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the 
United States Supreme Court. I served as a Commissioner on the Utah Public Service 
Commission from 1979 to 1985. Since 1985, my practice has been primarily corporate civil and 
regulatory representation of independent telephone companies in Utah and Idaho. I have 
represented clients before the Federal Communications Commission, the Utah Public Service 
Commission, and in litigation in Utah's federal courts. I have litigated for these clients 
against US West, AT&T, Sprint, and MCI in matters involving rate claims against these firms 
frequently in excess of a million dollars. Other business transactions for which I provide legal 
counsel and advice for these clients regularly involve sums several times that amount My 
regular billing rate for the professional services I provide for these clients is $190 per hour. 
I was asked by Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis to represent that entity as 
plaintiff in this litigation against several Davis County officers, and I agreed to do so at my 
regular billing rate plus associated costs. Because of the somewhat arcane nature of this 
litigation and the speed required to prepare and file a complaint before the printing deadline 
for the 2002 general election ballot, I recommended that the plaintiff also retain Janet Jenson 
and Andy Stavros, whose particular expertise with ballot initiatives is detailed below. 
Ms. Jenson: 
I have practiced law for more than twenty years in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., 
and Salt Lake City, Utah. I am a member of the American Health Lawyers Association and 
the State Bars of California, Utah and Arizona, and of the United States Supreme Court, where 
I was co-counsel in another case arising out of a citizens' initiative in Arizona: Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,137 L.Ed. 170,117 S.Ct. 1055 (1997). I am a graduate of 
the University of Utah College of Law, where I was a William Leary Scholar and an Editor of 
the Utah Law Review for two years. I clerked for Justice Dallin Oaks while he was a Justice of 
the Utah Supreme Court, and I have served in Congress as a Chief of Staff for a member of 
the U.S. House of Representatives. 
I am a founding partner of Jenson & Stavros, PLLC. My law partner, Andrew Stavros, 
and I were the authors and proponents of "Initiative B" in the 2000 general election. This 
initiative enacted an 80-page statute which created and amended multiple Utah laws 
regarding the standards and procedures by which law enforcement agencies and officials 
seize and forfeit assets. The "asset forfeiture reform" initiative - called "Initiative B" - was 
opposed by a very large number of public officials, including Governor Leavitt, Attorney 
General Mark Shurtleff, the Utah Highway Patrol, almost every county attorney and nearly 
every law enforcement agency in every county and city. Nevertheless, the voting public 
passed Initiative B with a nearly 70% approval vote - the largest margin of any citizen 
initiative in the nation in the 2000 general election. To enact that initiative, Mr. Stavros and I 
brought and won an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court. I am counsel of record and Mr. 
Stavros is the named plaintiff in one of the leading cases on Utah initiative law, Stavros v. 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 15 P.3d 1013 (Utah 2000). 
My regular billing rate for the professional legal services I render is $190 per hour, and 
that is the fee arrangement upon which I agreed to participate in the preparation and trial of 
this case. 
Mr. Stavros: 
I graduated from the University of Utah College of Law, where I was a William Leary 
Scholar, Traynor Moot Court Champion and Region XI National Moot Court Champion. I am 
a member of the American Bar Association Health Law Section, and the Utah State Bar. I 
clerked with Justice Daniel Stewart on the Utah Supreme Court. 
I am the principal author of "Initiative B" - the statewide initiative on asset forfeiture 
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reform, which was enacted on the 2000 general election ballot. I was the lead plaintiff, and 
Ms. Jenson and I were the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Utah Supreme Court case, Stavros 
v. Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 15 P.3d 1013 (Utah 2000). Following the 
voters' passage of the forfeiture reform initiative, some law enforcement officials challenged 
the constitutionality the new statute in federal district court. I authored the amicus brief on 
which the district court relied heavily to reach its favorable decision upholding the 
constitutionality of the new statute. 
My regular billing rate for the professional legal services I render is $120 per hour, and 
that is the fee arrangement upon which I agreed to participate in the preparation and trial of 
this case. 
As our attached billing summaries indicate, we have expended the following 
aggregations of professional time on this case: 
David R. Irvine 184.3 hours @ $190/hr = $35,017.00 
Janet I. Jenson 24.0 hours @ $190/hr = 4,560.00 
Andrew W. Stavros 43.25 hours @$120/hr = 5,190.00 
232.40 hours = $44,767.00 
Mr. Irvine incurred additional charges as follows: 
Copy costs: $127.15 Filing fee: $140.00 
The total fee requested by plaintiffs counsel is $45,034.15. 
Of the time expended, 24.1 hours ($4,579.00) of Mr. Irvine's time, 11.1 hours ($1,332.00) 
of Mr. Stavros' time, and 3.25 hours ($617.50) of Ms. Jenson's time were involved in the 
preparation of the Court's ruling, revisions to the ruling, and the conferences between counsel 
and the Court associated with it. The monetary time value associated with post-hearing 
issues (38.45 hours at $6,528.50) represent 16.5% of the total hours expended and 14.6% of the 
total dollar value associated with the prosecution of the case. A comprehensive hourly billing 
4 
breakout for each lawyer is attached to this Affidavit, and the attorneys each affirm that the 
times and services therein shown are accurately stated. 
We prepared the attached billing summaries from the daily time records we maintain. 
We account for our time as the work is completed; we do not reconstruct the time later. The 
billing rate is consistent with, if not lower than, billing rates of attorneys performing work of 
similar complexity and requiring similar experience and skill. 
The billing is reasonable and equitable both as to the amounts of time required to 
research the applicable law, prepare the pleadings and memoranda, prepare for the hearing, 
and prepare the order issued by the Court. The billing is also reasonable as well, with respect 
to the result achieved by the litigation. The result achieved by plaintiff was of significant 
benefit to the County as a whole, because it validated and secured the votes of the 52% 
majority of voters who supported fluoridating the water systems. Otherwise, that 2000 vote 
would have meant nothing. Moreover, because the County Attorney represented the 
minority who wanted to repeal the fluoridation vote by placing it back on the ballot this year, 
the majority of Davis County voters would have had no advocate at all in this proceeding and 
no voice before this court without our representation of them as counsel for the plaintiff. 
DATED this 30* day of October, 2002. 
o^-* • ^V/c« /~~~~ - ^ 
David R. Irvine 
Andrew W. Stavros 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 30th day of October, 2002. 
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH ~ DAVIS 
Attorney's Fees for David R. Irvine 
July 19,2002 (3.9 hrs) 
• Research initiative petition case law; copy charges $15.00. 
July 25,2002 (1.8 hrs) 
• Research initiative petition case law; copy charges $5.00. 
July 26,2002 (5.2 hrs) 
• Draft letter to Davis County Attorney summarizing applicable case law and 
requesting that the initiative petition be declared legally insufficient by the County 
Commission. 
July 27,2002 (4.0 hrs) 
• Revise County Attorney letter. 
July 28,2002 (7.3 hrs) 
• Revise County Attorney letter. 
July 31,2002 (1.0 hrs) 
• Meet with County Attorney re letter summarizing applicable case law and 
plaintiffs request that the Commission reject the petition as being legally 
insufficient. 
August 6,2002 (4.8 hrs) 
• Attend County Commission meeting at which fluoridation petition was to be 
considered for action by the Commission; research private attorney general case 
law; draft plaintiffs complaint. 
August 7,2002 (9.8 hrs) 
• Draft plaintiffs complaint. 
August 12,2002 (3.0 hrs) 
• Initiative petition case law research; revise complaint draft; meet with Janet Jenson 
and Andy Stavros regarding litigation strategy, analysis of issues to be raised, and 
division of litigation responsibilities. 
August 13,2002 (2.0 hrs) 
• Revise complaint draft. 
August 14,2002 (4.5 hrs) 
• Revise complaint; research initiative and referendum cases. Copy charges, $5.00. 
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August 15,2002 (3.3 hrs) 
• Revise and file plaintiffs complaint. Filing fee, $140.00; copy charges, $4.70. 
August 16,2002 (7.5 hrs) 
• Case research; draft motion for preliminary injunction; draft memorandum in 
support of motion for preliminary injunction. 
August 17,2002 (5.5 hrs) 
• Draft memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injimction. 
August 18,2002 (6.0 hrs) 
• Draft memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injimction; draft ex parte 
motion and memorandum for leave to file overlength memorandum; draft order 
granting approval to file overlength memorandum. 
August 19,2002 (4.4 hrs) 
• Revise memorandum in support of preliminary injimction. 
August 20,2002 (2.5 hrs) 
• Revise and file motion for preliminary injunction and memorandum in support. 
Copy charges, $47.07. 
August 21,2002 (2.0 hrs) 
• Research standing case law; copy charges $7.50. 
August 22,2002 (1.2 hrs) 
• Draft letter to Judge Dawson requesting accelerated hearing. 
August 24,2002 (5.8 hrs) 
• Re-draft Beth Beck affidavit; research case law re standing; copy charges, $8.00. 
August 25,2002 (5.3 hrs) 
• Draft memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss; research case law re 
standing; copy charges, $4.00. 
August 26,2002 (3.0 hrs) 
• Revise Beth Beck affidavit; review and analysis of defendant's answer and motion 
to dismiss. 
August 28,2002 (4.0 hrs) 
• Research case law re forms of legislation; draft rebuttal memorandum in support of 
motion for preliminary injunction; copy charges, $11.50. 
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August 29,2002 (5.0 hrs) 
• Draft rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction; 
revise memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss; revise Beth 
Beck affidavit; file memorandum and affidavit in opposition to defendants' motion 
to dismiss; copy charges, $10.39. 
August 30,2002 (6.5 hrs) 
• Draft rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction. 
August 31,2002 (2.1 hrs) 
• Revise rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction; 
copy charges, $5.00. 
September 3,2002 (5.1 hrs) 
• Research petition signing status of county officers; draft letter requesting 
information to County Clerk; revise rebuttal memorandum in support of motion 
for preliminary injunction and file with court; copy charges $6.00. 
September 4,2002 (5.8 hrs) 
• Research initiative constitutional issues; copy charges, $35.46. 
September 9,2002 (6.0 hrs) 
• Confer with John Fellows (Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel) 
regarding legislative history of UCA § 19-4-111; preparation of hearing exhibits. 
September 10,2002 (4.8 hrs) 
• Research legislative history of UCA § 19-4-111; confer w/Beth Beck re cases status; 
conference call with Judge Dawson, Jerry Hess. 
September 11,2002 (5.3 hrs) 
• Re-draft Lewis Garrett affidavit; prepare hearing exhibits; review legislative floor 
debate tapes covering amendments to UCA § 19-4-111. 
September 12,2002 (5.9 hrs) 
• Hearing preparation; case organization; copy charges, $4.10. 
September 13,2002 (7.5 hrs) 
• Hearing preparation; copy charges $5.50. 
September 13,2002 (3.5 hrs) 
• Hearing on motion for preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss. 
September 22,2002 (1.0 hrs) 
• Review draft order; draft transmittal letter to Judge Dawson, County Attorney. 
September 23,2002 (0.8 hrs) 
• Revise draft order, deliver to Judge Dawson, County Attorney. 
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September 25,2002 (1.5 his) 
• Confer with County Attorney re draft order. 
September 26,2002 (6.5 hrs) 
• Revise draft order. 
September 27,2002 (1.0 hrs) 
• Revise draft order; draft change letter to County Attorney. 
September 30,2002 (0.8 hrs) 
• Conference call with Judge Dawson, County Attorney re order revisions. 
October 2,2002 (7.4 hrs) 
• Review letter from County Attorney to Judge Dawson; review draft order; confer 
with Janet Jenson re requested order changes; draft letter to County Attorney. 
Revise draft order. 
October 4,2002 (5.1 hrs) 
• Conference call with Judge Dawson and County Attorney re draft order; revise 
draft order; draft letters to Judge Dawson, County Attorney; deliver order for 
signature. 
October 9,2002 (4.7 hrs) 
• Research and draft motion and memorandum for award of attorneys' fees. 
Total hours billed: 184.3 @ $190/hr $35,017.00 
Copy charges 127.15 
Filing fee 140.00 
TOTAL FEE $35,284.15 
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH - DAVIS 
Attorney's Fees for Andrew W. Stavros, JENSON & STAVROS, LLC 
August 9,2002 (4.20 hrs) 
Telephone call with David Irvine re initiative challenge; review letter sent to 
County Attorney concerning legality of allowing initiative to be placed on ballot. 
Research re applicable Utah law governing initiatives and referenda. 
August 12,2002 (5.30 hrs) 
Meeting with David Irvine and Janet Jenson re potential causes of action against 
Commissioners and Clerk; review proposed complaint and make recommended 
changes; research case law re standard for granting temporary restraining order. 
August 13,2002 (3.80 hrs) 
Draft Motion and Supporting Memorandum for preliminary injunction; review 
initiative case law supporting action against Clerk and Commissioners 
August 14,2002 (6.50 hrs) 
Review draft complaint sent by Mr. Irvine; make proposed changes to complaint 
and add relief and remedies section. Continue work on memorandum in support 
of motion for preliminary injunction 
August 15,2002 (3.70 hrs) 
Make final changes to memorandum in support of motion for preliminary 
injunction; telephone call with Mr. Irvine re the same. 
August 19,2002 (1.90 hrs) 
Review final draft of memorandum in support of motion to dismiss; send 
suggested changes and comments to Mr. Irvine 
September 12, 2002 (4.75 hrs) 
Review Defendants' memorandum in opposition to motion for preliminary 
injunction and supporting memoranda; meeting with Mr. Irvine and Ms. Jenson re 
preparation for hearing on preliminary injunction. 
September 13, 2002 (2.00 hrs) 
Attend hearing on preliminary injunction 
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September 17,2002 (2.50 hrs) 
Review tape from September 16,2002 telephone conference outlining Judge 
Dawson's decision. Beginning drafting order consistent with decision. 
September 18,2002 (6.30 hrs) 
Draft memorandum decision and order. 
September 19,2002 (2.30 hrs) 
Make final edits to memorandum decision and order; add section outlining legal 
conclusions supporting permanent injunction. 
Total hours billed: 43.25 @ $120/hr $ 5,190.00 
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH - JANET I. JENSON TIME 
8/12/02 1.3 hrs Meeting with David Irvine and Andrew Stavros regarding motion 
for permanent injunction on flouride ballot issue. 
8/19/02 3.1 hrs Reviewing and revising draft compliaint and motion in support of 
complaint for preliminary injunction. Telephone conference with 
David Irvine regarding suggested changes. 
8/23/02 .75 hrs Reviewing Defendants1 answer and motions to dismiss, arguments 
on standing, and memoranda in support of motions. Telephone 
conference with David Irvine regarding defendants' motions and 
arguments and possible responses. 
8/27/02 5.25 hrs Reviewing and revising draft responses by plaintiffs to defendants' 
motions and memoranda in support of motion. 
8/29/02 .2 hrs Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding revisions to 
motion on standing. 
8/30/02 .75 hrs Work with David Irvine regarding arguments on bases for 
preliminary injunction. 
9/3/02 5.25 hrs Reviewing and revising draft response to Defendants' motion and 
memorandum in opposition to preliminary injunction. 
9/12/02 2.0 hrs Preparation for oral arguments; "moot" trial on preliminary 
injunction. 
9/13/02 2.50 hrs Attendance at hearing on preliminary injunction. 
9/17/02 .3 hrs Conference call with Judge Dawson and opposing counsel 
regarding how Judge prefers order be drafted. 
9/18/02 2.25 hrs Revising draft order; conferences with A.W. Stavros regarding 
draft. 
9/20/02 .2 hrs Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding draft order as 
sent to Judge Dawson and opposing counsel. 
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9/23/02 .2 hrs Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding changes 
requested by opposing counsel in draft order. 
9/30/02 .3 hrs Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding additional 
changes requested by opposing counsel in draft order. 
Total hours billed: 24.35 @ $190/hr $ 4,626.50 
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17-18-2 COUNTIES 716 
(2) (a) Two or more counties, whether or not contiguous, 
may unite to create and maintain a state prosecution 
district by interlocal agreement pursuant to Title 11, 
Chapter 13. 
(b) At the time of the creation of the prosecution 
district, the participating counties shall be located within 
the same judicial district. 
(3) The county governing body or bodies shall not dissolve a 
prosecution district during the term of office of an elected or 
appointed district attorney. 1993 
17-18-2. Legal adviser to commissioners . 
(1) The county attorney is the legal adviser of the county. 
(2) The county attorney shall attend meetings of the county 
legislative body when required. 2002 
17-18-3. Repealed. 1971 
17-18-4. Licens ing requirement. 
No person shall be elected to the office of, or serve as county 
attorney, without being duly licensed to practice law in the 
state of Utah. 1957 
17-18-5. Requirements of office. 
(1) A person filing a declaration of candidacy for the office of 
county attorney or district attorney shall: 
(a) be a United States citizen; 
(b) be an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah who 
is an active member in good standing of the Utah State 
Bar; 
(c) be a registered voter in the county or prosecution 
district in which he is elected to the office; and 
(d) (i) have been, as of the date of the election, a 
resident of the county or prosecution district in which 
he seeks office for at least one year; or 
(ii) have been appointed and, at the time of filing, 
be serving as county or district attorney and have 
become a resident of the county or prosecution dis-
trict within 30 days after appointment to the office. 
(2) Each person appointed to the office of county attorney or 
district attorney shall be: 
(a) a United States citizen; and 
(b) an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah who is 
an active member in good standing of the Utah State Bar. 
1997 
CHAPTER 19 
COUNTY AUDITOR 
Section 
17-19-1. County auditor's powers and duties. 
17-19-2. Repealed. 
17-19-3. Payments — Notification. 
17-19-4. Repealed. 
17-19-5. Numbering of payments — Payments not pre-
sented for collection. 
17-19-6. Books to show receipts and disbursements. 
17-19-7. Current accounts with treasurer. 
17-19-8. Administration of oaths — Subpoena power. 
17-19-9. Books open to inspection. 
17-19-10, 17-19-11. Repealed. 
17-19-12. Joint statement with treasurer. 
17-19-13. Seal. 
17-19-14. Duties — Omnibus provision. 
17-19-15 to 17-19-18. Repealed. 
17-19-19. Budget officer — Departmental revenue and ex-
penditure reports. 
17-19-20 to 17-19-27. Repealed. 
17-19-28. Destruction of fee statements, warrants and 
claims filed for ten years. 
Section 
17-19-29. Monthly report to state treasurer. 
17-19-1. County auditor's powers and duties . 
(1) Each person seeking payment from a county on any bill, 
account, or charge of any nature, incurred by or on behalf of 
the county by any of the county officers or contracted for by the 
county executive, shall present the claim to the county audi-
tor. 
(2) The county auditor shall: 
(a) before the claim is paid: 
(i) investigate, examine, and inspect each claim; 
and 
(ii) recommend approval or disapproval of each 
claim and endorse the recommendation upon the 
claim; 
(b) report the claims and his recommendation to the 
county executive after the investigation is completed; and 
(c) keep, in a book kept for that purpose, a complete 
record of all claims, his recommendation on the claims, 
the reasons for the recommendation, and the action of the 
county legislative body on the claims. 
(3) (a) At least annually, the county auditor shall examine 
the books and accounts of the county executive, county 
attorney, district attorney, county treasurer, county clerk, 
county recorder, county sheriff, and county surveyor. 
(b) At least quarterly, the county auditor shall examine 
and reconcile the books and accounts of the county asses-
sor. 
(c) At least annually, the county auditor shall examine 
the books and accounts of the justice court judges. 
(d) The county auditor may examine the books and 
accounts of all other county offices or administrative units 
of the county. 
(e) In a multicounty prosecution district, the county 
auditor specified in the interlocal agreement creating the 
prosecution district may examine the books and accounts 
of the district attorney. 
(4) (a) To fulfill the requirements of this section, each 
county officer, office, or administrative unit shall give the 
county auditor complete and free access to all books, 
records, and papers. 
(b) (i) If the county auditor finds tha t the books and 
accounts of any county officer, office, or administra-
tive unit are not kept according to law or that 
incorrect or improper reports have been made by 
those officers, offices, or administrative units, he shall 
report his findings to the county executive at their 
next regular meeting. 
(ii) If the county auditor finds tha t the records of a 
justice court judge are not kept according to law or 
tha t incorrect or improper reports have been made by 
the justice court judge, the county auditor shall 
provide a copy of his report to the state court admin-
istrator, in addition to reporting his findings to the 
county executive and county legislative body. 1996 
17-19-2. Repealed. 1996 
17-19-3. Payments — Notification. 
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (l)(b), each claim incurred by 
the county and legally examined and allowed and ordered 
paid by the county executive shall, if approved by the 
county auditor as to the availability of funds as provided 
in Section 17-19-1, be paid by: 
(i) a warrant drawn by the auditor on the county 
treasurer in favor of the person entitled to payment; 
or 
(ii) a county check or such other payment mecha-
nism as may be adopted pursuant to Chapter 36, 
Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Counties. 
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Section 
17-20-1.7. 
17-20-2. 
17-20-3. 
17-20-4. 
17-20-5. 
Clerk's duties. 
Repealed. 
County clerk — Record of notaries public. 
Duties of county clerk. 
Report of election and appointment of officers. 
17-20-1. County c l e r k — District court clerk duties . 
The county clerk is the clerk of the legislative body of the 
county. The clerk shall act as clerk of the district court in 
secondary counties of the state district court administrative 
system and those counties not in the system, and shall 
perform the duties listed in Section 78-3-30. 2001 
17-20-1.5. C le rk of county legis lat ive body. 
The county clerk is the clerk of the county legislative body. 
17-20-1.7. Clerk's duties . 
The clerk shall: 
(1) record all proceedings of the county legislative body; 
(2) make full entries of all resolutions and decisions of 
the county legislative body on all questions concerning the 
county; 
(3) record the vote of each member on any question 
upon which there is a division; 
(4) prepare and certify duplicate lists of all claims, 
showing the amount and date of each claim or order and 
the date of the allowance or rejection of the claim, which 
lists shall be countersigned by the county executive; 
(5) deliver to and leave with the county auditor one of 
the lists referred to in Subsection (4) and deliver to and 
leave with the county treasurer the other list; 
(6) file and preserve the reports of the county officers to 
the county legislative body; 
(7) preserve and file all accounts acted upon by the 
county legislative body, except such as are necessarily 
kept by the auditor; 
(8) preserve and file all petitions and applications for 
franchises, and record the action of the county legislative 
body on them; 
(9) authenticate with the clerk's signature and the seal 
of the county the proceedings of the county legislative 
body if the proceedings are ordered published; 
(10) authenticate with the clerk's signature and the 
seal of the county all ordinances or laws passed by the 
county legislative body, and record them at length in the 
ordinance book; 
(11) record all orders levying taxes; 
(12) keep at the clerk's office all county books, records, 
and accounts that the clerk is required by law to keep and 
keep them open at all times during regular business 
hours for public inspection; and 
(13) perform all other duties required by law or by any 
rule or order of the county legislative body. 2000 
(2) execute under the clerk's seal and in the name ol 
and for the county, all deeds and conveyances of all rea] 
estate conveyed by the county; 
(3) take and certify acknowledgments and administei 
oaths; 
(4) keep a fee book as provided by law; and 
(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county, 
and keep other records and perform other duties as may 
be prescribed by law. 2001 
17-20-5. Report of e lect ion and appointment of offic-
ers. 
Within ten days after a county clerk issues a certificate oJ 
election or a certificate of appointment made to fill vacancies 
in elective county offices, the county clerk shall prepare ani 
forward to the lieutenant governor a certified report showing 
(1) the name of the county; 
(2) the name of the county office to which the person' 
was elected or appointed; 
(3) the date of the election or appointment of the 
person; 
(4) the date of the expiration of the term for which the 
person was elected or appointed; 
(5) the date of the certificate of election or appoint-
ment; and , 
(6) the date of the qualification of the person elected or 
appointed. 2000 
CHAPTER 21 
17-20-2. Repealed. 1989 
RECORDER 
Section 
17-21-1. 
17-20-3. C o u n t y c l e r k — Record of n o t a r i e s public. 
The county clerk of each county receiving certifications of 
lotaries public from the lieutenant governor shall keep and 
naintain an indexed record for that purpose, showing the 
lames of all persons holding notarial commissions, with the 
iates of issuance and expiration. 2003 
L7-20-4. Dut ies of county clerk. 
A county clerk shall: 
(1) issue all marriage licenses and keep a register of 
marriages as provided by law; 
Recorder — Document custody responsibility 
— Electronic submission procedures and 
guidelines. 
17-21-2. Seal. 
17-21-3. Original documents or copies of original docu-
ments to be kept by the county. 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
17-21-5. Receipts for recording of instruments. 
17-21-6. General duties of recorder — Records and 
indexes. 
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed. 
17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments. 
17-21-10. Judgments affecting real estate. 
17-21-11. Notice given by recording. 
17-21-12. Recording procedures — Endorsements of en-
try number required on documents. 
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page — Return of 
instrument. 
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence. 
17-21-15. Repealed. 
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of 
oaths. 
17-21-17. Prohibited acts. 
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance. 
17-21-18.5. Pees of county recorder. 
17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies. 
17-21-20. Recording required — Recorder may require 
tax serial number. 
17-21-21. Ownership plats — Use of geographic informa-
tion systems or computer systems. 
17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in own-
ership to county assessors — Use of geo-
graphic information systems or computer 
systems. 
17-21-23, 17-21-24. Repealed. 
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(b) of all those measures approved by the people as law 
that the Supreme Court has determined to be in conflict, 
proclaim as law the one that received the greatest number 
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majorities. 
1994 
20A-7-311. Effective date. 
(1) (a) Any proposed law submitted to the people by refer-
endum petition that is approved by the voters at any 
election does not take effect until at least five days after 
the date of the official proclamation of the vote by the 
governor. 
(b) Any act or law submitted to the people by referen-
dum tha t is approved by the voters at any election takes 
effect on the date specified in the referendum petition. 
(c) If the referendum petition does not specify an effec-
tive date, a law approved by the voters at any election 
takes effect five days after the date of the official procla-
mation of the vote by the governor. 
(2) (a) The governor may not veto a law adopted by the 
people. 
(b) The Legislature may amend any laws approved by 
the people at any legislative session after the law has 
taken effect. 1994 
20A-7-312. Misconduct of e lectors and officers — Pen-
alty. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to: 
(a) sign any name other than his own to any referen-
dum petition; 
(b) knowingly sign his name more than once for the 
same measure at one election; 
(c) sign a referendum knowing he is not a legal voter; or 
(d) knowingly and willfully violate any provision of this 
part. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to sign the verification for 
a referendum packet knowing that: 
(a) he does not meet the residency requirements of 
Section 20A-2-105; 
(b) he has not witnessed the signatures of those per-
sons whose names appear in the referendum packet; or 
(c) one or more persons whose signatures appear in the 
referendum packet is either: 
(i) not registered to vote in Utah; or 
(ii) does not intend to become registered to vote in 
Utah. 
(3) Any person violating this section is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(4) The attorney general or the county clerk shall prosecute 
any violation of this section. 1999 
PART 4 
LOCAL INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA -
PROVISIONS 
GENERAL 
20A-7-401. Limitat ion — Budgets . 
(1) The legal voters of any county, city, or town may not 
initiate budgets or changes in budgets. 
(2) The legal voters of any county, city, or town may not 
require any budget adopted by the local legislative body to be 
submitted to the voters. 1994 
20A-7-402. Local voter information pamphlet — Con-
tents — Limitations — Preparation — State-
ment o n front cover. 
(1) The county or municipality tha t is the subject of an 
initiative or referenda shall prepare a local voter information 
pamphlet that meets the requirements of this part. 
(2) (a) The arguments for and against initiatives and ref-
erenda shall conform to the requirements of this section. 
(b) Persons wishing to prepare arguments for and 
against initiatives and referenda shall file a request with 
the local legislative body at least 45 days before the 
election at which the proposed measure is to be voted 
upon. 
(c) If more than one person or group requests the 
opportunity to prepare arguments for or against any 
measure, the governing body shall make the final desig-
nation according to the following criteria: 
(i) sponsors have priority in making the argument 
for a measure; and 
(ii) members of the local legislative body have 
priority over others. 
(d) The arguments in favor of the measure shall be 
prepared by the sponsors, whether of the local legislative 
body or of a voter or voter group, but not more than five 
names shall appear as sponsors. 
(e) The arguments against the measure shall be pre-
pared by opponents from among the local legislative body, 
if any, or from among voters requesting permission of the 
local legislative body to prepare these arguments. 
(f) The arguments may not exceed 500 words in length. 
(g) The arguments supporting and opposing any county 
or municipal measure shall be filed with the local clerk 
not less than 30 days before the election at which they are 
to be voted upon. 
(3) (a) In preparing the local voter information pamphlet, 
the local legislative body shall: 
(i) ensure tha t the arguments are printed on the 
same sheet of paper upon which the proposed mea-
sure is also printed; 
(ii) ensure that the following statement is printed 
on the front cover or the heading of the first page of 
the printed arguments: 
"The arguments for or against the proposed mea-
sure^) are the opinions of the authors."; 
(iii) pay for the printing and binding of the local 
voter information pamphlet; and 
(iv) ensure that the local clerk distributes the 
pamphlets either by mail or carrier not less than 
eight days before the election at which the measures 
are to be voted upon, 
(b) (i) If the proposed measure exceeds 500 words in 
length, the local legislative body may direct the local 
clerk to summarize the measure in 500 words or less. 
(ii) The summary shall state where a complete 
copy of the measure is available for public review. 
1994 
20A-7-403, 20A-7-404. Renumbered as §§ 20A-7-501, 
20A-7-601. 1994 
PART 5 
LOCAL INITIATIVES — PROCEDURES 
20A-7-501. Init iatives. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person 
seeking to have an initiative submitted to a local legisla-
tive body or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection 
shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(i) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes exceeds 25,000; 
(ii) 12 V2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more 
than 10,000; 
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(iii) 15% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more 
than 2,500; 
(iv) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more 
than 500; 
(v) 25% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes does not exceed 500 but is more than 
250; and 
(vi) 30% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 
town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total 
number of votes does not exceed 250. 
(b) In addition to the signature requirements of Sub-
section (a), a person seeking to have an initiative submit-
ted to a local legislative body or to a vote of the people for 
approval or rejection in a county, city, or town where the 
local legislative body is elected from council districts shall 
obtain, from each of a majority of council districts, legal 
signatures equal to the percentages established in Sub-
section (a). 
(2) If the total number of certified names from each verified 
signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of names 
required by this section, the clerk or recorder shall deliver the 
proposed law to the local legislative body at its next meeting. 
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall either adopt or reject 
the proposed law without change or amendment within 30 
days of receipt of the proposed law. 
(b) The local legislative body may: 
(i) adopt the proposed law and refer it to the 
people; 
(ii) adopt the proposed law without referring it to 
the people; or 
(iii) reject the proposed law. 
(c) If the local legislative body adopts the proposed law 
but does not refer it to the people, it is subject to 
referendum as with other local laws. 
(d) (i) If a county legislative body rejects a proposed 
county ordinance or amendment, or takes no action 
on it, the county clerk shall submit it to the voters of 
the county at the next regular general election. 
(ii) If a local legislative body rejects a proposed 
municipal ordinance or amendment, or takes no ac-
tion on it, the municipal recorder or clerk shall 
submit it to the voters of the municipality at the next 
municipal general election. 
(e) (i) If the local legislative body rejects the proposed 
ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on it, the 
local legislative body may adopt a competing local 
law. 
(ii) The local legislative body shall prepare and 
adopt the competing local law within the 30 days 
allowed for its action on the measure proposed by 
initiative petition. 
(iii) If the local legislative body adopts a competing 
local law, the clerk or recorder shall submit it to the 
voters of the county or municipality at the same 
election at which the initiative proposal is submitted. 
(f) If conflicting local laws are submitted to the people 
at the same election and two or more of the conflicting 
measures are approved by the people, then the measure 
tha t receives the greatest number of affirmative votes 
shall control all conflicts. 1994 
20A-7-502. Local init iat ive process — Application pro-
cedures. 
(1) Persons wishing to circulate an initiative petition shall 
file an application with the local clerk. 
(2) The application shall contain: 
(a) the name and residence address of at least five 
sponsors of the initiative petition; 
(b) a statement indicating that each of the sponsors: 
(i) is a registered voter; and 
(ii) (A) if the initiative seeks to enact a county 
ordinance, has voted in a regular general election 
in Utah within the last three years; or 
(B) if the initiative seeks to enact a municipal 
ordinance, has voted in a regular municipal elec-
tion in Utah: 
(I) except as provided in Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii)(B)(II), within the last three years; 
or 
(II) within the last five years, if the spon-
sor's failure to vote within the last three 
years is due to the sponsor's residing in a 
municipal district tha t participates in a mu-
nicipal election every four years; 
(c) the signature of each of the sponsors, attested to by 
a notary public; and 
(d) a copy of the proposed law. 1997 
20A-7-503. Form of init iat ive pet i t ions and signature 
sheets . 
(1) (a) Each proposed initiative petition shall be printed in 
substantially the following form: 
"INITIATIVE PETITION To the Honorable , 
County Clerk/City Recorder/Town Clerk: 
We, the undersigned citizens of Utah, respectfully de-
mand that the following proposed law be submitted to: the 
legislative body for its approval or rejection at its next 
meeting; and the legal voters of the county/city/town, if 
the legislative body rejects the proposed law or takes no 
action on it. 
Each signer says: 
I have personally signed this petition; 
I am registered to vote in Utah or intend to become 
registered to vote in Utah before the certification of the 
petition names by the county clerk; and 
My residence and post office address are written cor-
rectly after my name." 
(b) The sponsors of an initiative shall attach a copy of 
the proposed law to each initiative petition. 
(2) Each signature sheet shall: 
(a) be printed on sheets of paper 8 V2 inches long and 11 
inches wide; 
(b) be ruled with a horizontal line 3A inch from the top, 
with the space above that line blank for the purpose oi 
binding; 
(c) contain the title of the initiative printed below the 
horizontal line; 
(d) contain the word ''Warning" printed or typed a t the 
top of each signature sheet under the title of the initiative: 
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the 
following statement printed or typed in not less thar 
eight-point, single leaded type: 
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign anj 
initiative petition with any other name than his own, oi 
knowingly to sign his name more than once for the same 
measure, or to sign an initiative petition when he knows 
he is not a registered voter and knows that he does no1 
intend to become registered to vote before the certificatior 
of the petition names by the county clerk."; 
(f) contain horizontally ruled lines, 3/s inch apart und© 
the "Warning" statement required by this section; 
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(g) be vertically divided into columns as follows: 
(i) the first column shall appear at the extreme left 
of the sheet, be 5/s inch wide, be headed with "For 
Office Use Only", and be subdivided with a light 
vertical line down the middle with the left subdivi-
sion entitled "Registered" and the right subdivision 
left untitled; 
(ii) the next column shall be three inches wide, 
headed "Registered Voter's Printed Name (must be 
legible to be counted)"; 
(iii) the next column shall be three inches wide, 
headed "Signature of Registered Voter*'; and 
(iv) the final column shall be 4 % inches wide, 
headed "Street Address, City, Zip Code"; and 
(h) contain the following statement, printed or typed 
upon the back of each sheet: 
"Verification 
State of Utah, County of _ 
I, , of _ , hereby state that: 
I am a resident of Utah and am at least 18 years old; 
All the names that appear on this sheet were signed by 
persons who professed to be the persons whose names 
appear in it, and each of them signed his name on it in my 
presence; 
I believe that each has printed and signed his name and 
written his post office address and residence correctly, and 
that each signer is registered to vote in Utah or intends to 
become registered to vote before the certification of the 
petition names by the county clerk. 
(3) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory, 
and, if substantially followed, the initiative petitions are 
sufficient, notwithstanding clerical and merely technical er-
rors. 2000 
20A-7-504. C i r cu l a t i on r e q u i r e m e n t s — Local c le rk to 
provide sponsors with materials. 
(1) In order to obtain the necessary number of signatures 
required by this part, the sponsors shall circulate initiative 
packets that meet the form requirements of this part. 
(2) The local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors: 
(a) one copy of the initiative petition; and 
(b) one signature sheet. 
(3) The sponsors of the petition shall. 
(a) arrange and pay for the printing of all additional 
copies of the petition and signature sheets; and 
(b) ensure that the copies of the petition and signature 
sheets meet the form requirements of this section. 
(4) (a) The sponsors may prepare the initiative for circula-
tion by creating multiple initiative packets. 
(b) The sponsors shall create those packets by binding 
a copy of the initiative petition, a copy of the proposed law, 
and no more than 50 signature sheets together at the top 
in such a way that the packets may be conveniently 
opened for signing. 
(c) The sponsors need not attach a uniform number of 
signature sheets to each initiative packet. 
(5) (a) After the sponsors have prepared sufficient initia-
tive packets, they shall return them to the local clerk. 
(b) The local clerk shall: 
(i) number each of the initiative packets and re-
turn them to the sponsors within five working days, 
and 
(ii) keep a record of the numbers assigned < o each 
packet. 2000 
20A-7-505. Obtaining signatures —• Verification « Re-
moval of signature. 
(1) Any Utah voter may sign a local initiative petition if the 
voter is a legal voter and resides in the local jurisdiction. 
(2) flie sponsors shall ensure that the person in whose 
presence each signature sheet was signed. 
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency 
requirements of Section 20A-2-105; and 
(b) verifies each signature sheet by completing the 
verification printed on the back of each signature sheet. 
(3) (a) (i) Any voter who has signed an initiative petition 
may have his signature removed from the petition by 
submitting a notarized statement to that effect to the 
local clerk. 
(ii) In order for the signature to be removed, the 
statement must be received by the local clerk before 
he delivers the petition to the county clerk to be 
certified. 
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the local clerk shall 
remove the signature of the person submitting the state-
ment from the initiative petition 
(c) No one may remove signatures from an initiative 
petition after the petition is submitted to the county clerk 
to be certified. 2000 
20A-7-506. Submitt ing t h e i n i t i a t i ve p e t i t i o n — Cer t i -
fication of signatures by the county clerks — 
Transfer to local clerk. 
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general 
election, for county initiatives, or municipal general election, 
for municipal initiatives, the sponsors shall deliver each 
signed and verified initiative packet to the county clerk of the 
county in which the packet was circulated 
(2) No later than 90 days before anv general election the 
county clerk shall 
(a) check the names of all persons completing the 
verification on the back of each signature sheet to deter-
mine whether or not those persons are residents of I Ttah 
and are at least 18 years old; and 
< b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not 
a 1 Ttah resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the 
attorney general and county attorney. 
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the 
county clerk shall-
(a) check all the names of the signers against the 
official registers to determine whether or not the signer is 
a voter; 
(b) certify on the petition whether or not each name is 
that of a voter; and 
(c) deliver all of the packets to the local clerk 2000 
20A-7-507. Evaluation by the local clerk. 
(1) When each initiative packet is received from a county 
clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record the number 
of each initiative packet filed. 
(2) (a) After all of the initiative packets have been received 
by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the number of 
the names certified by the county clerk that appear on 
each verified signature sheet. 
(b) If the total number of certified names from each 
verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of 
names required by Section 20A-7-501, the local clerk shall 
mark upon the front of the petition the word "sufficient." 
(c) If the total number of certified names from each 
verified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the 
number of names required by Section 20A-7-501, the local 
clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word 
"insufficient." 
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of 
the sponsors of his finding 
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified 
signatures from each verified signature sheet to be insuffi-
cient, any sponsor may file a written demand with the local 
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clerk for a recount of the signatures appearing on ihe initia-
tive petition in the presence of any sponsor. 
(4) (a) Once a petition is declared insufficient, the sponsors 
may not submit additional signatures to qualify the 
petition for the pending election. 
(b) If the petition is declared insufficient, the petition 
sponsors may submit additional signatures to qualify the 
petition for: 
(i) the next regular general election following the 
pending regular general election if the petition was a 
county initiative petition; or 
(ii) the next municipal general election if the peti-
tion was a municipal initiative petition. 
(5) (a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any 
initiative petition, any voter may apply to the supreme 
court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so 
within ten days after the refusal. 
(b) If the supreme court determines that the initiative 
petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file it, 
with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of 
the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his 
office. 
(c) If the supreme court determines that any petition 
filed is not legally sufficient, the supreme court may 
enjoin the local clerk and all other officers from certifying 
or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure 
on the official ballot for the next election. 2002 
20A-7-508. Ballot t i t l e — Dut i e s of loca l c le rk a n d loca l 
a t to rney . 
(1) Whenever an initiative petition is declared sufficient for 
submission to a vote of the people, the local clerk shall deliver 
a copy of the petition and the proposed law to the local 
attorney. 
(2) (a) The local attorney shall: 
(i) entitle each county initiative that has qualified 
for the ballot "Citizen's County Initiative Number 
" and give it a number; 
(ii) entitle each municipal initiative that has qual-
ified for the ballot "Citizen's City (or Town) Initiative 
Number " and give it a number; 
(hi) prepare a ballot title for the initiative; and 
(iv) return the petition and the ballot title to the 
local clerk within 15 days after its receipt. 
(b) The ballot title may be distinct from the title of the 
proposed law attached to the initiative petition, and shall 
express, in not exceeding 100 words, the purpose of the 
measure. 
(c) The ballot title and the number of the measure as 
determined by the local attorney shall be printed on the 
official ballot. 
(d) In preparing ballot titles, the local attorney shall, to 
the best of his ability, give a true and impartial statement 
of the purpose of the measure. 
(e) The ballot title may not intentionally be an argu-
ment, or likely to create prejudice, for or against the 
measure. 
(3) Immediately after the local attorney files a copy of the 
ballot title with the local clerk, the local clerk shall serve a 
copy of the ballot title by mail upon any of the sponsors of the 
petition. 
(4) (a) If the ballot title furnished by the local attorney is 
unsatisfactory or does not comply with the requirements 
of this section, at least three of the sponsors of the petition 
may, by motion, appeal the decision of the local attorney to 
the Supreme Court. 
(b) The Supreme Court shall examine the measures 
and hear arguments, and, in its decision, shall certify to 
the local clerk a ballot title for the measure that fulfills 
the intent of this section. 
(c) The local clerk shall print the title v< TURM win 
the Supreme Court on the official ballot. -
20A-7-509. Form of ballot — Manner of voting. 
(1) The local clerk shall ensure that the numbc i— ' 
title are printed upon the official ballot with, irr 
the right of them, the words "For" and "Against," eacn v 
followed by a square in which the elector may indicate 1 
vote. 
(2) Electors desiring to vote in favor of enacting the 
proposed by the initiative petition shall mark the squarjj 
following the word "For," and those desiring to vote againsj 
enacting the law proposed by the initiative petition shall rr 
the square following the word "Against." 
20A-7-510. R e t u r n a n d c a n v a s s — Conflicting HI. 
s n r e s — Law effective on p roc l ama t ion . 
(1) The votes on the law proposed by the initiative petition 
shall be counted, canvassed, and delivered as provided in Title 
20A, Chapter 4, Par t 3, Canvassing Returns. 
(2) After the local board of canvassers completes its can-
vass, the local clerk shall certify to the local legislative body 
the vote for and against the law proposed by the initiative 
petition. 
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall immediately issue a 
' proclamation that: 
(i) gives the total number of votes cast in thi local 
jurisdiction for and against each law proposed 
initiative petition; and 
(ii) declares those laws proposed by an initio 
petition that were approved by majority vote to b 
full force and effect as the law of the local jurisdiction 
.(b) When the local legislative body determines that twc 
proposed laws, or that parts of two proposed laws afi 
proved by the people at the same election are entirely 15c 
conflict, they shall proclaim that measure to be law tha: 
has received the greatest number of affirmative votes 
regardless of the difference in the majorities which thosj 
measures have received. ' : 
(c) (i) Within ten days after the local legislative body*! 
proclamation, any qualified voter who signed thi 
initiative petition proposing the law that is declare* 
by the local legislative body to be superseded b; 
another measure approved at the same election ma 
apply to the supreme court to review the decision. 
(ii) The court shall: -t 
(A) immediately consider the matter and de 
cide whether or not the proposed laws are i 
conflict; and 
(B) within ten days after the matter is submit 
ted to it for decision, certify its decision to th 
local legislative body. 
(4) Within 30 days after its previous proclamation, the loc£ 
legislative body shall: 
(a) proclaim all those measures approved by the peopj 
as law that the supreme court has determined are not l 
conflict; and 
(b) of all those measures approved by the people as la^  
that the supreme court has determined to be in co'nflic 
proclaim as law the one that received the greatest numbe 
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majoritiei 
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20A-7-511. Effective d a t e . 
(1) (a) Any proposed law submitted to the people by initio 
tive petition that is approved by the voters at any electic 
takes effect on the date specified in the initiative petition 
(b) If the initiative petition does not specify an effectft 
date, a law approved by the voters at any election tab 
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(c) contain the title of the referendum printed below 
the horizontal line; 
(d) contain the word "Warning" printed or typed at the 
top of each signature sheet under the title of the referen-
dum; 
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the 
following statement printed or typed in not less than 
eight-point, single leaded type: 
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign any 
referendum petition with any other name than his own, or 
knowingly to sign his name more than once for the same 
measure, or to sign a referendum petition when he knows 
he is not a registered voter and knows that he does not 
intend to become registered to vote before the certification 
of the petition names by the county clerk."; 
(f) contain horizontally ruled lines, 3/s inch apart under 
the "Warning" statement required by this section; 
(g) be vertically divided into columns as follows: 
(i) the first column shall appear at the extreme left 
of the sheet, be % inch wide, be headed with "For 
Office Use Only," and be subdivided with a light 
vertical line down the middle; 
(ii) the next column shall be three inches wide, 
headed "Registered Voter's Printed Name (must be 
legible to be counted)"; 
(iii) the next column shall be three inches wide, 
headed "Signature of Registered Voter"; and 
(iv) the final column shall be 4 % inches wide, 
headed "Street Address, City, Zip Code"; and 
(h) contain the following statement, printed or typed 
upon the back of each sheet: 
"Verification 
State of Utah , County of 
I, , of , hereby state that: 
I am a resident of Utah and am at least 18 years old; 
All the names that appear on this sheet were signed by 
persons who professed to be the persons whose names 
appear in it, and each of them signed his name on it in my 
presence; 
I believe tha t each has printed and signed his name and 
writ ten his post office address and residence correctly, and 
tha t each signer is registered to vote in Utah or intends to 
become registered to vote before the certification of the 
petition names by the county clerk. " 
(3) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory, 
id, if substantially followed, the referendum petitions are 
fficient, notwithstanding clerical and merely technical er-
rs. 2000 
•A-7-604, Circulation requirements — Local clerk to 
provide sponsors wi th materials . 
1) In order to obtain the necessary number of signatures 
mired by this part, the sponsors shall circulate referendum 
ikets tha t meet the form requirements of this part. 
2) The local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors: 
(a) five copies of the referendum petition; and 
(b) five signature sheets. 
3) The sponsors of the petition shall: 
(a) arrange and pay for the printing of all additional 
copies of the petition and signature sheets; and 
(b) ensure that the copies of the petition and signature 
sheets meet the form requirements of this section. 
I) (a) The sponsors may prepare the referendum for circu-
lation by creating multiple referendum packets. 
(b) The sponsors shall create those packets by binding 
a copy of the referendum petition, a copy of the law that is 
the subject of the referendum, and no more than 50 
signature sheets together at the top in such a way that the 
packets may be conveniently opened for signing. 
(c) The sponsors need not attach a uniform number of 
signature sheets to each referendum packet. 
(5) (a) After the sponsors have prepared sufficient referen-
dum packets, they shall return them to the local clerk, 
(b) The local clerk shall: 
(i) number each of the referendum packets and 
return them to the sponsors within five working days; 
and 
(ii) keep a record of the numbers assigned to each 
packet. 1994 
20A-7-605. Obtaining s ignatures — Verification — Re-
moval of s ignature. 
(1) Any Utah voter may sign a local referendum petition if 
the voter is a legal voter and resides in the local jurisdiction. 
(2) The sponsors shall ensure that the person in whose 
presence each signature sheet was signed: 
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency 
requirements of Section 20A-2-105; and 
(b) verifies each signature sheet by completing the 
verification printed on the back of each signature sheet. 
(3) (a) Any voter who has signed a referendum petition 
may have his signature removed from the petition by 
submitting a notarized statement to tha t effect to the local 
clerk. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), upon re-
ceipt of the statement, the local clerk shall remove the 
signature of the person submitting the statement from 
the referendum petition. 
(c) A local clerk may not remove signatures from a 
referendum petition after the petition has been submitted 
to the county clerk to be certified. 2000 
20A-7-606. Submitt ing the referendum petit ion — Cer-
tification of s ignatures by the county clerks — 
Transfer to local clerk. 
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general 
election for county referenda, or municipal general election foi 
local referenda, the sponsors shall deliver each signed and 
verified referendum packet to the county clerk of the county in 
which the packet was circulated. 
(2) No later than 90 days before any general election, th# 
county clerk shall: 
(a) check the names of all persons completing the. 
verification on the back of each signature sheet to deter-: 
mine whether or not those persons are Utah residents and" 
are at least 18 years old; and >* 
(b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not 
a Utah resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the, 
attorney general and county attorney. 
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the, 
county clerk shall: 
(a) check all the names of the signers against the^  
official registers to determine whether or not the signer i^ 
a voter; ] 
(b) certify on the referendum petition whether or not' 
each name is that of a voter; and 
(c) deliver all of the referendum packets to the loca| 
clerk. 200$ 
20A-7-607. Evaluation by the local clerk. q 
(1) When each referendum packet is received from a counfo 
clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record the number, 
of each referendum packet filed. 
(2) (a) After all of the referendum packets have been rfc£ 
ceived by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the 
number of the names certified by the county clerks that 
appear on each verified signature sheet. f 
(b) If the total number of certified names from eacj| 
verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number pj 
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names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local clerk shall 
mark upon the front of the petition the word "sufficient." 
(c) If the total number of certified names from each 
verified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the 
number of names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local 
clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word 
"insufficient." 
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of 
the sponsors of his finding. 
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified 
signatures from each verified signature sheet to be insuffi-
cient, any sponsor may file a written demand with the local 
clerk for a recount of the signatures appearing on the refer-
endum petition in the presence of any sponsor. 
(4) (a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any 
referendum petition, any voter may apply to the Supreme 
Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so 
within ten days after the refusal. 
(b) If the Supreme Court determines tha t the referen-
dum petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file 
it, with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of 
the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his 
office. 
(c) If the Supreme Court determines that any petition 
filed is not legally sufficient, the Supreme Court may 
enjoin the local clerk and all other officers from certifying 
or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure 
on the official ballot for the next election. 1995 
20A-7-608. Ballot t it le — Dut ies of local clerk and local 
attorney. 
(1) Whenever a referendum petition is declared sufficient 
for submission to a vote of the people, the local clerk shall 
deliver a copy of the petition and the proposed law to the local 
attorney. 
(2) (a) The local attorney shall: 
(i) entitle each county referendum that has quali-
fied for the ballot "Citizen's County Referendum 
Number " and give it a number; 
(ii) entitle each municipal referendum that has 
qualified for the ballot "Citizen's City (or Town) Ref-
erendum Number " and give it a number; 
(iii) prepare a ballot title for the referendum; and 
(iv) return the petition and the ballot title to the 
local clerk within 15 days after its receipt. 
(b) The ballot title may be distinct from the title of the 
law that is the subject of the petition, and shall express, in 
not exceeding 100 words, the purpose of the measure. 
(c) The ballot title and the number of the measure as 
determined by the local attorney shall be printed on the 
official ballot. 
(d) In preparing ballot titles, the local attorney shall, to 
the best of his ability, give a true and impartial statement 
of the purpose of the measure. 
(e) The ballot title may not intentionally be an argu-
ment, or likely to create prejudice, for or against the 
measure. 
(3) Immediately after the local attorney files a copy of the 
ballot title with the local clerk, the local clerk shall serve a 
copy of the ballot title by mail upon any of the sponsors of the 
petition. 
(4) (a) If the ballot title furnished by the local attorney is 
unsatisfactory or does not comply with the requirements 
of this section, at least three of the sponsors of the petition 
may, by motion, appeal the decision of the local attorney to 
the Supreme Court. 
(b) The Supreme Court shall examine the measures 
and hear arguments, and, in its decision, shall certify to 
the local clerk a ballot title for the measure that fulfills 
the intent of this section. 
(c) The local clerk shall print the title verified to hir 
the Supreme Court on the official ballot. 
20A-7-609. Form of ballot — Manner of voting. 
(1) The local clerk shall ensure that the number and ba 
title are printed upon the official ballot with, immediatel; 
the right of them, the words "For" and "Against," each w 
followed by a square in which the elector may indicate 
vote. 
(2) (a) Unless the county legislative body calls a spec 
election, the county clerk shall ensure that referenda t] 
have qualified for the ballot appear on the next regu 
general election ballot. 
(b) Unless the municipal legislative body calls a spec 
election, the municipal recorder or clerk shall ensure tr 
referenda tha t have qualified for the ballot appear on t 
next regular municipal election ballot. 
(3) Voters desiring to vote in favor of enacting the k 
proposed by the referendum petition shall mark the squa 
following the word "For," and those desiring to vote again 
enacting the law proposed by the referendum petition shE 
mark the square following the word "Against." 19 
20A-7-610. Return and canvass — Conflicting mei 
sures — Law effective on proclamation. 
(1) The votes on the law proposed by the referendum 
petition shall be counted, canvassed, and delivered as p n 
vided in Title 20A, Chapter 4, Part 3, Canvassing Returns. 
(2) After the local board of canvassers completes its car 
vass, the local clerk shall certify to the local legislative bod 
the vote for and against the law proposed by the referendurj 
petition. 
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall immediately issue i 
proclamation that: 
(i) gives the total number of votes cast in the loca 
jurisdiction for and against each law proposed by £ 
referendum petition; and 
(ii) declares those laws proposed by a referendum 
petition that were approved by majority vote to be in 
full force and effect as the law of the local jurisdiction, 
(b) When the local legislative body determines that two 
proposed laws, or that parts of two proposed laws ap-
proved by the people at the same election are entirely in 
conflict, they shall proclaim that measure to be law tha t 
has received the greatest number of affirmative votes, 
regardless of the difference in the majorities which those 
measures have received. 
(4) (a) Within ten days after the local legislative body's 
proclamation, any qualified voter who signed the referen-
dum petition proposing the law that is declared by the 
local legislative body to be superseded by another mea-
sure approved at the same election may apply to the 
Supreme Court to review the decision. 
(b) The Supreme Court shall: 
(i) immediately consider the matter and decide 
whether or not the proposed laws are in conflict; and 
(ii) within ten days after the matter is submitted to 
it for decision, certify its decision to the local legisla-
tive body. 
(5) Within 30 days after its previous proclamation, the local 
legislative body shall: 
(a) proclaim all those measures approved by the people 
as law tha t the Supreme Court has determined are not in 
conflict; and 
(b) Qf all those measures approved by the people as law 
that the Supreme Court has determined to be in conflict, 
proclaim as law the one tha t received the greatest number 
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majorities. 
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